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Turkey has had diplomatic relations with Europe since the era of the Ottoman 
Empire. Although the Ottoman Empire was included in the concept of Europe, it was 
never considered “European.” With the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Turkey 
began to see Europe as a political and economic model of modernization.  The initial 
impetus for modernization occurred in the wake of the creation of the Turkish Republic 
by Kemal Attaturk in 1923.  The struggle toward Europeanization was advanced with 
Turkey’s entry into NATO after World War II. During the Cold War, Turkey’s strategic 
importance determined the country’s relationship with the European Community. 
However, the end of the Cold War changed that relationship in Europe.  
After WWII, with the Truman Doctrine, the United States increased its 
commitment to Turkey as part of the American containment policy. The above 
relationship marked the cooperation of the country with the United States and its western 
orientation. As a result, Turkey joined NATO in 1952.  Aspirations for becoming a 
European member began to be fulfilled with the Ankara Agreement. The agreement was 
signed on 12 September 1963 and went into effect on 1 December 1964. The cornerstone 
of this agreement was the establishment of a custom union in three stages.  
An additional protocol was signed on 23 November 1970 and went into effect on 
1 January 1973. The protocol established a timetable of technical measures to be done to 
accomplish the objectives of the customs union within a period of 22 years.  The 
European Parliament finally approved the customs union on December 1995 after strong 
U.S. support.1  
After the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the coup of 1980, Turkey’s relation with 
Europe deteriorated. Following the coup and free elections under Ozal’s governorship, 
Turkey entered a period of economic liberalization marked by improvement to its  
                                                 
1 See Katherine A. Wilkens, “Turkey Today: Troubled Ally’s Search for Identity,” p. 19. 
1 
economy. Turkey, in 1987, applied for membership to the European Community. The 
Commission, however, rejected Turkey’s application in December 1989 citing both 
economic and political reasons as justification for its decision. 
Europe was transformed as an entity and became the European Union (EU). The 
accession of new members was concluded at the Copenhagen summit. The decision of 
the summit was that every member becoming a member of the union had to comply with 
certain economic and political criteria.2 It also appears that the entry of new members 
was not a question of if, but how they would become a member.  
The last enlargement of EU took place  taking into consideration the Copenhagen 
Criteria. The Luxemburg summit accepted the eligibility of other countries for 
membership, and among these was Cyprus, but it rejected Turkey’s candidacy3. Instead, 
it decided to draft a strategy to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing the country 
closer to the standards of the EU, confirming at the same time at the highest level, 
Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the EU. The council also decided that it would 
determine Turkey’s fate using the same criteria as for the other applicant countries.4 The 
rejection was a great disappointment to Turkey and worsened the situation and its stance 
towards the EU.  
Therefore, it appears that with the end of the Cold War, economic and political 
issues now dominate strategic concerns.  This shift in EU priorities raised questions about 
Turkey’s candidacy for membership as well as where Turkey actually belongs. 
On the one hand, Europe changed its membership criteria. The integration of new 
members highlighted a clear shift toward political considerations. On the other hand, 
Turkey did not recognize this shift and strived mainly for economic measures such as 
abandoning the import substitution strategy, and opening its economy. However, the 
Luxemburg Summit rejected Turkey’s candidacy mainly for political reasons. The EU  
                                                 
2 See European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, Par 7.  
3 See Luxemburg European Council Press Release: Luxembourg, 12 December 1997, par 27 and par 
31.  
4 Ibid., par 31. 
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accepted finally Turkey as a candidate state at the Helsinki summit in December 1999. 
Turkey now could become a member with the same criteria applied to the other candidate 
states.5  
Turkey’s candidacy is a significant development, but it does not dispel all doubts 
about the country’s political orientation.  Turkey now has the opportunity to become a 
member if it is able to meet the membership criteria. Therefore, the Helsinki decisions 
sharpened the questions of how the Turks view their future and how compatible Turkey’s 
current and long term activist approach is with the postmodern international environment 
in the West. Could Turkey become a member of the EU? This paper is an effort to 
uncover the problems that lie ahead for Turkey’s membership. The most problematic 
aspect for Turkey is the political criteria. The thesis will propose the political reforms that 
the country must implement. It analyzes the problems and concerns that might complicate 
this procedure both in the domestic and international environments.    
B. IMPORTANCE 
Turkey’s acceptance by the EU as a candidate member at the 1999 Helsinki 
Summit improved its relationship with Europe. However, the implications of membership 
would entail important changes in Turkey’s internal and external policy and a more astute 
social policy.  The same reason entails Turkey’s acceptance of a detailed examination of 
its policies by the EU. This acceptance implies an opening of its internal political 
practices to an unprecedented degree. Political and military elites will have to accept a 
less prominent role. However, the success of the country’s entry into the EU is very 
important since it implies a clear way out of Turkey’s economic and political crisis.  
Turkey’s failure to enter the EU could also result in the country’s isolation from 
Europe. This isolation, in turn, could trigger a shift toward the East and unwillingness to 
cooperate with Western powers. A Turkish oriented non-Western approach could result 
in a more unpredictable Turkey in its foreign policy intensions and practices.6 
Turkey has been on the verge of war with Greece three times during the past few 
years. Turkey’s membership and its political implications could be a crucial factor in the 
                                                 
5 See Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, par 12. 
6 See Ian O. Lesser, “Turkey, Greece, and the U.S. in a Changing Strategy Environment: Testimony 
before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Europe,” p. 3. 
3 
preservation of stability and peace in South East Europe and in the region around the 
Aegean Sea. Turkey’s progress in the EU is, therefore, of great importance for specialists 
in international security, strategic planning and must be taken into account by 
policymakers and defense planning personnel.   
C. MAJOR ARGUMENTS   
This paper answers the following question. Is Turkey qualified to enter the EU? 
This question is answered by addressing the following related questions?  Could 
Turkey accept policy changes at both the domestic and international levels to 
accommodate the EU directives.? What will be the military’s reaction? Could it accept a 
less prominent role? What are the implications of Islamic revivalism? Will it threaten the 
European orientation of the country? Could it generate a shift away from the country’s 
Western orientation?  
Finally, how does international policy affect Turkey? What are the security 
concerns that might create problems.? How do they create problems for human and 
minority rights? How could all these affect Turkey’s candidacy? 
Turkey’s candidacy is of great importance both for the country and for the West. 
There are many requirements now that Turkey must meet in order to enter the EU. 
Turkey’s economic situation is very significant and many steps have to be taken, but, 
with the help of the EU and foreign aid, Turkey might be able to meet these criteria. The 
path of the custom unions demonstrates that Turkey will be able to overcome the 
economic aspect. However, the political implications of its candidacy constitute a major 
problem. The criteria of the EU now threaten the prerogatives of the political elites in the 
country. Security issues also complicate the effort since the implications of candidacy 
may threaten the territorial integrity of the country. The members of the EU, such as 
Greece and Cyprus, may threaten the prospects of Turkey’s membership if they do not 
see clear evidence of Turkey’s goodwill regarding their security.  
Turkey’s candidacy has a long road ahead. First, the political elites whose 
interests are threatened by the implications of candidacy must accept some reduction in 
their power. In order to do so, they must be convinced that there are no significant 
4 
dangers that will threaten the security of the country. In this effort, both the EU and the 
United States could be a crucial factor since they can provide guarantees for this security.  
The recent U.S. operation in Iraq is also a significant factor. If the United States 
succeeds in consolidating a peaceful and western-oriented democracy in Iraq, an 
important threat to Turkey can be removed. Security will be a determinant factor for the 
country in order to implement significant reforms regarding human rights and minority 
rights. Minority rights especially will be a major concern for Turkey since they involve 
the Kurds. 
Turkey’s accession is very important. It can provide the paradigm that Islam and 
democracy are compatible. Turkey can also improve the image of Europe since it can 
highlight how it is possible to prove that an institution is crucial for the improvement of 
the world by simply providing the right incentives.  
Turkey in the EU and the implications of accession could be a crucial stabilizing 
factor since it could relieve the tension in South East Europe, where in many cases, the 
dispute between Greece and Turkey has endangered the cohesion of NATO, and most 
importantly, has been a source of possible conflict. Therefore, Turkey’s accession seems 
very significant. Thus, the United States and the EU’s assistance will be important for the 
country in order to achieve its aspirations   
D. METHODOLOGY  
The thesis primarily employs a case study to examine the political and 
international implications of Turkey’s candidacy for membership in the EU. The first 
case discusses the implications of Islam in the country, and mainly political Islam. The 
second case suggests that Turkey must transform its domestic politics. The third case 
explores how security issues complicate efforts for reforms concerning human and 
minority rights. Finally, the fourth case examines how the international environment and 
relations with neighboring countries raise security concerns for Turkey and might 
complicate its accession. 
E. CHAPTER BY CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This paper will be organized into six chapters. The historical links with Turkey 
and Europe, and the purpose of the thesis, are the main focus of the introduction. 
5 
Turkey’s orientation appears to be threatened by the revival of political Islam in the 
country. Since there was an effort to shift orientations and cooperation with other Islamic 
countries, and attempts at reconciliation and inquiries into the benefits of western 
orientation, the rise of political Islam created concerns about the orientation of the 
country, and subsequently, its EU aspirations. Therefore, Chapter II explores the potential 
and the consequences of political Islam and tries to assess its implication for EU 
aspirations specifically.  
Chapter III highlights the domestic problems posed by EU candidacy. The 
military elite created the first government in Modern Turkey. Since then, the military 
continued to determine the political path of the country. Modern Turkey has to provide 
23 free elections. However, few believe that the country has a true democracy. The 
political criteria entail a truly democratic government. An impediment to this is the status 
of the military, and specifically, civil military relations. Thus, the chapter explores the 
potentiality of the military elite in Turkey. The military continues to be strong, and 
therefore, any effort towards alignment with the European standard could be fruitless. 
Could the military stance prove a real impediment to accession? Will the military elite 
accept a lesser role in political matters, as the EU wants? These will be the concerns of 
this chapter. 
Chapter IV explores the country’s considerable domestic security concerns. It 
discusses the problems that primarily derive from the implications of EU succession. 
Thus, it includes an account of human rights and minority rights, and the progress made 
towards accession. Since minority rights in Turkey’s case are very complicated because 
of the Kurdish issue, the chapters highlights the implications of the Kurds and estimates 
the difficulties for Turkey to implement complete reforms taking in account the country’s 
security issues and the political conditions.  
Chapter V explores the international security concept that might create problems 
for Turkey. An impediment for Turkey’s aspirations has been the relationship and the 
dispute with Greece. The EU decision concerning Turkey in some cases in the past has 
been blocked by Greece’s veto power. Their relations worsened with the invasion in 
Cyprus in 1974. The Helsinki summit also called on the candidate countries to resolve 
6 
any border disputes before accession. Thus, Turkey has to agree to a viable solution 
concerning its borders. Since the past is characterized by mutual animosity, Greece’s 
stance and the stance of Cyprus after its membership could create great impediments to 
Turkey’s accession. Could this dispute endanger the prospects of Turkey? What will be 
Greece’s stance? This chapter answers these questions. 
The final chapter concludes that Turkey is highly motivated  and has made a great 
deal of progress. Turkey might not succeed in meeting the date for the negotiations for 
accession at the end of 2004. However, it is closer than ever. This effort will likely 
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II. THE RISE OF ISLAM IN TURKEY: APPLYING SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT THEORY 
Turkey has been a secular state since the era of Kemal Attaurk. However, the 
great transformation which happened under the leadership of Kemal and the efforts 
toward Europeanization and Westernization of the country was not a simple process. 
During that process, the crucial role of religion in the Ottoman empire and the legacy that 
carried through to the creation of Turkey’s republic must not be forgotten. Modern 
Turkey’s secularization course might be described as the state’s control of religion and 
not its complete elimination from the political realm.  
Therefore, religion in Turkey was always an important factor for the success of 
political parties and was used both by the state and its political adversaries. Although the 
concept of religion was important from the outset, a rise in political Islam in the post-
1980 era occurred to an exceptional degree.  This increase actually happened with the 
success of political parties that mainly used the concept of religion as the central aspect 
of their political message. Thus, a clear depiction of Islam derives form the electoral 
performance first of the Welfare Party (RP), later of the Virtue Party(FP) and finally of 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) which won the elections of 4 November 2002.  
The religious aspect was not only a problem for the country but was also a 
concern for the European members which raised some questions about the final outcome 
for the country’s integration into the European Union (EU). The former Dutch Foreign 
Minister, Hans van Mierlo, for example, said “There is a problem of a large Muslim state. 
Do we want that in Europe? It is an unspoken question.”7 Moreover, and which might be 
the most important issue, is that the Islamic Political movement in Turkey created great 
concerns and ambiguities regarding its own intensions, and its dynamic in Turkish policy. 
It appeared, thus, as a threat that could lead the country on a path different from the long 
standing secular and western oriented approach. As such, the movement was 
continuously under suspicion and under the strong eye of the state elite.  
                                                 
7 F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, “Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty,” p. 60. 
9 
Actually, the movement in some cases showed an Eastern inclination and efforts 
at cooperation and orientation towards other Muslim countries have been attempted. 
Simultaneously, a rhetoric against western ideas and institutions have been cultivated. 
This stance raised inquiries about the power of the movement to assert a different role in 
Turkey’s foreign policy and to create impediments to each accession to the EU.  
The main purpose of this chapter is to explain the rise of political Islam in Turkey. 
In doing so, the investigation will try to assert if there are inherent dynamics that could 
lead to a different orientation for the country and thus jeopardize EU prospects.  
Therefore, this paper starts with a description of the electoral path of the Islamic 
movement in Turkey after the 1960’s. It continues with an analysis of opportunities in the 
political realm provided to the movement and accounts for its enhancement. Next, an 
investigation of the leadership’s responses and the messages that help to sustain the 
movement follows. The next section provides the resources and the methods used by the 
Islamic movement to preach its message and how it appealed to the constituency. The 
final section presents the conclusions as well as an assessment of the success of the 
political movement and its implications for the western orientation of the country, and 
mainly, for its EU prospects.  
A. THE ELECTORAL PATH 
The RP and FP are actually descendents of the National Outlook Movement 
which was started by a group of protesters within the centre right Justice Party (AP). The 
product of this movement was the creation of the National Order Partly (MNP) in 1969 
and its ideological framework and its successor is known as the National Outlook. The 
parties advocating this framework were banned by military intervention and were 
introduced later with a different name. 
The MNP was proscribed by the military intervention of 1971, and shortly 
thereafter, it reappeared as the National Salvation Party (MSP). It remained on the 
political scene for eight years until it was banned by the military coup in 1980 along with 
the other parties. It reappeared as the Welfare Party (RP) in 1983 under the same MSP 
leadership. The RP was shut down again in 1997 by another military intervention and 
reappeared as the Virtue Party (FP). 
10 
The significance of these parties in the political life of their era was not equally 
distributed. Actually there is an increase in the appeal of the Islamic oriented parties 
mainly after the 1980’s which raises questions about the causes of their future success. 
The second incarnation of the movement, the MSP, gained 11.8% of the popular votes 
and 10.6% of the seats in the Parliament in 1973’s national elections. In the following 
1977 elections, it received only 8.5% of the votes and 5.5% of the seats in the Parliament. 
The party was supported mainly by religious sects and its declining performance in the 
second electoral cycle actually happened because one of these sects withdrew its support 
from the party. It is also important to note that during this earlier period, the main support 
for the party was found in the underdeveloped rural areas of the country.8 
The same insignificant performance characterized the political path of its 
successor, the Welfare Party after 1983. However, an important difference appeared 
during the 1991 national elections. The party succeeded in increasing its constituencies 
from 7.16% in the previous 1987’s national elections to the very high and unprecedented 
degree of 16.88%. The performance of the party continued to increase and gained 21.38 
% in the following 1995 national elections having been declared the winner of 1994 
municipal elections before that. Finally, the party was banned by the Constitutional 
Criminal Court in 1997 and reappeared in the 1999 election as the Virtue Party and 
gained 15.41% of the votes. The forth incarnation of the MSP, the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), emerged after the Virtue Party was banned. The party was the 
undisputable winner of the 2002 elections gaining 34.28% of the votes and 363 of the 
seats in the Parliament.9  
B. OPPORTUNITIES IN THE POLITICAL, DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL CONCEPT 
The rise of political Islam is a phenomenon that deserves special treatment and 
creates concern and inquires about its dynamics and emergence. Several different 
opinions are trying to shed light on the revivalism of Islam in a country with a strong 
secular past characterized, in many cases, by military intervention in state politics. The  
                                                 
8 N. Balkan and S. Savran, “The Politics of Permanent Crisis. Class, Ideology and State in Turkey,” p. 
111. 
9 See http://www.ifes.org/eguide/resultsum/turkey_par02RES.htm, accessed 12 February 2004. 
11 
aforementioned increasing path of the parties representing political Islam in Turkey can 
be investigated by first exploring the occasions in the political realm that helped lead to 
the establishment of the movement. 
C. THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION  
One of the main factors that helped the rise of Islam in Turkey was the 
globalization and its effects on the economy. “The paradox of neoliberal globalization is 
that it unifies and integrates while it fragments and marginalizes.”10 While it is very 
successful in financial aspects, its progress concerning labor mobility lags far behind.  
Neoliberal globalization actually creates large opportunities for small groups of highly 
skilled employees but the vast majority of labor remains restricted and confined to small 
incomes and job perspectives. It is exactly these people who turn their attention to the 
state authorities and leadership for help. On the other hand,, globalization processes 
further exacerbated the problem. It is exactly the idea of globalization which places many 
limitations on the state’s protectionist measures and interventionist policies. Under these 
circumstances, states proved inefficient in protecting the rights of their constituencies, 
who were mainly the losers in the globalizations processes, and as a consequence, 
resentment runs high. As a result, people turn to more fundamentalist or nationalist 
movements which threaten the democratization processes in some cases. Thus, identity 
politics based on race, religion, or ethnic identity and supported by these large groups of 
losers appear whose purpose is to protect their interests.11 
Hence, these explanations do not support only the emergence and rise of 
fundamentalism, but in addition, the appeal and increase of other forms of identity 
politics such as the far right or nationalism politics. Similar patterns in the rise of these 
groups in Western Europe and Latin America in the form of the far right for the former 
and nationalism for the latter, is a clear indication of the effect of globalization.12 
 
                                                 
10 Journal of International Affairs, Ziya Onis, “Neoliberal Globalization and the Democracy Paradox: 
The Turkish General Elections of 1999,” Fall 2000, 54, no. 1, p. 284. 
11 Ibid., p. 287. 
12 Ibid. 
12 
In the specific context of Turkey’s society, the effect of globalization followed by 
other factors discussed later, resulted in the emergence, and actually, the rise of both the 
Islamic and nationalist movement as expressed in the success of their representative 
political parties. 
The path of Islam’s rise in Turkey shows a small electoral performance during the 
1980’s and some evidence, although not accurate enough, suggests that the main 
supporters of the Islamic parties emanated from the poor and uneducated segment of the 
population.13 During the 1990’s, there is a clear increase in the electoral performance 
which started with the 1991 elections and reached peak levels in 1995 when the main 
representative of Islamic politics, the RP, was declared the first party.  
However, it is not only a movement of the poor. It also includes people who have 
benefited from the globalization processes but remained outside of the political elite. It is 
important for these groups to acquire political power using the resources of the economic 
power they possessed and which increased through the opportunities of the liberalization 
of the economy.   
A shift from the domination of material to financial capital is also an effect of 
globalization which undermined the past logic of a regulating economy. The shift was 
marked by the decreasing role of the state in economic life as well as the decline of the 
importance and influence of the labor unions. The combination of these led to the 
formation of informal networks characterized by social relations and reciprocity.14 The 
above result was not, of course, unique to Turkey’s situation. Similar patterns of 
“network” solutions have emerged in other Muslim countries as a protectionist 
mechanism for the poor and deprived, but also among those dominating the financial and 
political stage with Egypt being a prominent case.15 
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It was the combination of the decline of the state protection mechanisms and the 
appearance of these reciprocity networks that highlighted the importance of religion. 
Religion actually provided both the space and the ideological concept for the creation of 
these networks, which to an extent, appear as the protector of the poor. However, the 
creation of these networks was not limited only to the protection of the marginalized and 
desperate segment of the population, but they appeared also as means of cooperation and 
exchange of technology and information among strong entrepreneurships under the same 
ideological framework. One of them, the most prominent and a decisive supporter of 
political Islam in Turkey, was the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association 
(MUSIAD) to be described later. 
It will not be safe, however due to the aforementioned issues, to characterize the 
Islamic political movement as the political outlet of the poor and marginalized segment 
of the population since they are actually those who carried the burden of the globalization 
processes. Globalization as stated previously,  created opportunities for others to both 
emerge with and increase their economic power. Those who actually benefited and 
gained power in economic terms remained outside of the political elite of the country. It 
is the combination of these two groups of Turkey’s society that created the base upon 
which the Islamic political movement took its initial impetus. Thus, it is a cross class 
coalition that characterizes the organizational structure of the movement that actually 
unifies two groups excluded from the globalization processes in a different sense: the 
poor and the rich excluded from the political elite.16   
D. MILITARY INTERVENTION 
The role of globalization was not the sole factor that determined the rise of the 
Islamic political movement in Turkey. Additional dynamics contributed to this as well. 
One of them was, of course, the role of the state and mainly the military position toward 
the Islamic issue. It is important to keep in mind, that notwithstanding the secular past of 
Turkey’s politics, the issue of religion was never neglected instate policies. Not only  
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because of this issue, but in many cases, religion was used both to legitimize current 
regimes and to support policy decisions, or nationalism and identity orientations of the 
county. 
A clear change toward Islam took place mainly after the military coup in 1980. 
Until then, Islam remained subservient to the secular standards. However, a clear 
tolerance of Islamic elements in the political realm appeared afterwards. According to the 
new posture toward Islamic issues, the state constitutionally declared religious education 
mandatory in both primary and secondary schools. Sufi tarikats, banned in 1925, 
appeared strong again and their members penetrated many ranks of political society.17  
The aforementioned policy toward Islam was not of course out of the question. It 
came actually as an effort to stabilize policy decisions by the regimes. The leader of the 
military regime, General Kenan Evren, during the 1980 coup, used Islam to rationalize 
and legitimize his intention to turn the political system of the country to more 
authoritarian principles.18 Following the state provision for religious education, Evren 
announced that “Secularism does not mean depriving Turkish citizens of religious 
instruction and exposing them to exploiter of religion.”19 
Except for handling Islam as a means of consolidating and legitimizing its 
authoritarian rule, the military regime supported Islam for another important reason. The 
military has been the representative and vanguard of Turkey’s secular politics. It was the 
bad situation of the 1970’s that mad the military elites turn their attention to Islam and 
used it as a stabilizing force for the domestic social and political issues. A crucial factor 
in this decision is their effort to counterweight all the destabilizing forces and mainly the 
opposition of the left.  
Backing Islam for counter-weighting the left it is not, of course, something new in 
the course of Middle Eastern politics. A similar pattern of the above tactic can be found 
in Egypt when Sadat revived the Muslim Brotherhood in order to counterweight the left,  
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in Lebanon, where the same reason also contributed to the emergence of Hezbollah, and in 
Palestine where Israel supported the rise of Islam, although not to counterweight the left 
but mainly the power of the PLO.    
In this effort, Turkey increased the power of the Directorate of Religious Affairs 
and actually increased its resources as well. The above policy exploited the vast resources 
that led to the creation and propagation of religious schools throughout the country. As a 
result, these same schools appeared as the main supporters of the welfare party in the 
following years.20 
E. PARTY FRAGMENTATION 
Military intervention proved to be a crucial factor for Islamic revivalism for 
another important reason which also made the rise of the Islamic movement possible. 
This reason was the shutting down of the major political parties and the banning of their 
political leaders before 1980. Prominent political figures remained outside the political 
scene whose goal for the military was to start anew by severing the affiliations from the 
instability of the past. 
According to the military beliefs, the previous instability was a product of the 
fragmentation of the party system. What the military actually wanted was a two party 
system able to support the reforms which were necessary for the country to exit its 
economic and political crises. However, notwithstanding the intentions, the above 
military measures proved fruitless. Moreover, following the transition to democracy, the 
referendum of September 1987 abolished the banning of key politicians. 
The new reality dawned with the return of the old and strong political figures in 
Turkey’s policy matters. Their return also happened in a manner that exacerbated the 
political scene in Turkey. Instead of returning to their previous parties, these politicians 
created the new political parties which were under their direct control. Thus, a further 
fragmentation of political parties occurred instead of them being limited which was 
supposed to be the goal of the military measures. It is important to note that during this 
process, parties with a similar ideological context and the only difference being the 
leadership also appeared. 
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It is exactly these above processes that weakened the power of the established 
parties and provided the opportunities to identity the parties (nationalism, Islamism) to 
flourish and increase their ideological performance. 
F. ELECTORAL SYSTEM KURDISH BANNING 
The banning of the political parties was not the only measure taken away from the 
military elite in order to avoid fragmentation and help create strong governments. The 
elite also introduced a 10% national threshold for the parties in order to participate in the 
formation of the government. 
Despite this extremely high threshold, the results of the municipal elections of 
1989 showed a high level of fragmentation and instability. No matter the real purpose for 
the imposition of the above threshold, the final beneficiaries were the parties of identity 
politics, and mainly the Welfare Party, as the representatives of the Islamic movement of 
the era. 
The success of the Welfare Party came from the support of people with social 
backgrounds whose party could not reach that threshold.  Additionally, the support of the 
Kurds also contributed further to the electoral performance of the Welfare Party. 
Particularly in the 1994 elections, the party increased its constituencies in the Kurdish 
regions. The Kurdish Democratic Party withdrew from the elections and their supporters 
turned their votes to the Welfare Party not as a favor, but mainly as an expression of 
hostility to the other political parties and because it was closer to their social beliefs.21 
G. EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP 
The opportunities described above proved crucial for the emergence of the 
Islamic political movement as a dominant actor in Turkish politics. However, this success 
could no be achieved without an effective leadership. The electoral path of political Islam 
is mainly an attribution of a man who was the leader of all the parties that represented the 
political expression of Islam until the final elections of 2002 with the AKP: the 
Necmettin Erbakan.  
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The Necmettin Erbakan created MSP after the banning of MNP via military 
intervention. Both parties were ideologically situated to the National Outlook movement. 
Small and medium enterprises were given importance in their political discourse. The 
businessmen and owners of these enterprises have been discriminatorily excluded from 
the Union of Champers dominated by the interests of large companies. The 
administration of the organization was usually determined by the will of the government. 
Nonetheless, Erbakan succeeded in wining the elections for the administration mobilizing 
the owners of these small and medium companies. The government did not recognize his 
election and replaced him immediately thereafter, but this experience proved crucial for 
his success. The governmental discrimination faced by medium and small companies was 
one of the main slogans of his electoral campaigns.22        
During the tenure of the three coalition governments in which his MSP was a 
partnership, Erbakan tried to control the Ministry of Industry and Technology. Using the 
power that the Ministry provided to him, he strived to expand the control of the state over 
the public state firms which led its party to oppose the partners in the coalition 
governments. However, MSP’s efforts to use public funds in order to cultivate patron 
client relations with its constituency is apparently the real reason behind the 
disagreement. Thus, the collapse of the coalition was primarily the effort of the MSP to 
gain in political matters at the expense of its partners.23 Additionally, during its tenure, 
the party preached the strategic orientation of the country and the cultivation of strong 
relationships with Muslim countries. 
In the 1990’s as a leader of RP since the MSP was banned and closed, Erbakan 
continuously declared the linkage between the RP and the MSP and the big contribution 
of MSP to the development of heavy industry in Turkey. The party, taking into account 
the expansion of economic liberalism, continues to push for relations with Muslim 
countries but this time inside the framework of the necessity for economic relations and 
trade. The change towards the control of the public sector is important as well. The party  
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appears to support privatization, however, it remains sensitive to the conditions of 
privatization such as being against the sale of companies to foreigners and having 
concerns about the fate of the employees after the privatization process.24   
The economic liberalization as, stated previously, enhanced the economic power 
of the small and medium enterprises which accommodated the new reality of 
consumption and wealth that brought about the reforms of the Ozal. The egalitarian 
message of the party which was successful during the year that  MNP and MSP were on 
the political scene could not continue its appeal in an environment with such obvious and 
strong income inequality. Islamic references were now used in such a careful way as to 
attract both the losers of the economic liberalization without excluding those who had 
gained from the same procedures.25 Thus, the organization now turned its attention to 
justice instead of equality as the primary social aim.  
Important also is the position of the Islamic political party toward the foreign 
policy issues. The leadership was and continued to be against the integration with the 
European Union (EU). In line with the policy of the MNP and MSP, the official position 
of the RP declared the integration with the EU as a part of a conspiracy whose goals was 
to make Turkey a province of Greater Israel.26 However, with the formation of the RP-
led coalition government with Tansu Ciller’s DYP, the party remained agreed to the 
commitment of the government to follow the pro-European policy. Moreover, the party 
appeared far less prone to express its previous views.  
The party, following the general mood which was in favor of integration with the 
EU also changed its formal mindset which was against the integration. The decision 
might have resulted from the effort to avoid the continuous banning by state authorities, 
and more specifically, by the military elite. However, it seems to be a supporter of 
integration and adjusted this position asserting that Europe will guarantee the free 
expression of religion and its political ambitions.27  
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The final incarnation of Islamic politics, the AKP party, which won the final 2002 
elections with an impressive 34.28% of the votes, seems to adopt the same policy toward 
the EU. Under the leadership of Tayyip Erdogan, it proclaimed itself pro-Europe while it 
has denied that Islam is central to its platform.28 
H. RESOURCES 
One of the most important aspects of the success of a movement is the resources it 
possesses.  In the case of the Islamic revival in Turkey, the resources came because of the 
successful policy of the organization along with the help of external factors. 
In the contemporary context of Turkey, religious sects acquired significant 
economic power. In addition, certain business association were created to represent 
Muslim businessmen. The MUSIAD (the Association of Independent Industrialists and 
Businessmen) is prominent and seems to operate by exploiting the networks that Islam as 
a religion provides. The Islamic business represents a major financial base for the Islamic 
party.29  
During the 1980’s, with the economic reforms of Ozal’s government, the 
economic power of these Islamic businesses greatly increased. The creation of the 
MUSIAD is a recent phenomenon. The organization was founded in 1991 and asserts 
itself as a largely voluntary business association with more than 3,000 members. The 
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) is the other important 
association that represents the heavy industries of the country with about 400 members.  
What actually could characterize the political orientation of the business associations is 
that TUSIAD appeared as the supporter of the secular state while MUSIAD supports 
political Islam. 
One of the main element of MUSIAD’s agenda was the references to the 
exclusion of Muslim’s Business from the support of the state. The message of social 
disadvantage and the campaign of Erbakan’s political party since his unlucky  
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commitment to the Union of Champers proved a strong link between the organization and 
the Islamic movement. In fact, the expectations were to become the beneficiaries of a 
government of a similar Islamic identity.  
The different political orientation between the two strong business associations 
highlights an adversary in policy matters that might be based on a struggle for their 
economic interests.  However, the diverse interest between MUSIAD and TUSIAD are 
nonetheless united on the desire to decrease the role of the state.30 
Except for the contribution of the MUSIAD, other resources proved decisive in 
the success of the Islamic Party. One of the main contributors were the workers in 
Germany. Their finances proved important both for the party but also for the economic 
businesses conducted by the MUSIAD. Some companies relied on trust relations inside 
Islamic networks and invested the money from the workers and thus produced profits for 
both without, however, any legal protection. 
Finally, along with these contributions, the economic help of Saudi Arabia 
provided further resources for the Islamic movement. Saudi capital arrived in the country 
in order to exploit the economic opportunities of the economic liberalization or to help 
Islamic revivalism directly.31 
I. ISLAMIC MOBILIZATION 
A common explanation for the rise of the Islamic political movement in Muslim 
countries lies in the fact that Muslim states are governed by some kind of authoritarian 
regimes which dominate public affairs. In such an environment, direct opposition is not 
allowed and people resort to being unaffected by the state and in some cases, the private 
or semi-private institution in order to mobilize their constituencies. In most cases, the 
dominant institution that provides mobilizing opportunities for a movement is the 
mosques since the state cannot challenge them directly.   
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In the specific context of Turkey’s politics, authoritarian regimes might be 
irrelevant. However, mosques here proved a crucial factor for the cultivation of the 
Islamic movement. Moreover, the country’s politics faced military intervention in many 
cases after World War II. During the military governorship, mosques were important and 
unaffected mobilizing structures would provide venues for organizing political opposition 
since the military regime prohibited direct opposition.  Organizing political movements 
inside or relied upon religious institutions would, as a result, lead the political movement 
toward Islamic values. 
In addition to these more explicitly religious-based institutions, the Islamist 
movement in Turkey relied upon other social service institutions, mainly in the 
educational realm.  The importance of these institutions resulted from the military 
regime’s policy in the 1980’s. The support of religious education and its imposition as 
mandatory in primary and secondary schools, in combination with the increase of the 
budget to religious oriented projects, led to the creation and propagation of religious 
schools during this period.  These religious schools were later the driving and supporting 
force for the religious oriented politics. 
Furthermore, the message of political Islam and its appeal became possible 
through the use of the media mainly after the 1980 coup. The liberalization processes of 
Ozal’s government and the relative support of moderate Islam by the state elite during 
this era paved the way for the emergence of a powerful mainstream Islamic media. 
Expanding during the following years, the Islamic media by 1994 totaled 19 television 
stations and 45 radios.32 Moreover, this media enabled the emergence of Islamic 
Intellectuals who found a way to reach a large pool of people and preach the new Islamic 
ideas.  
Finally, the informal networks created in Turkey’s society mainly after the 
liberalization of economy following Ozal’s government economic reforms proved 
effective for the mobilization of political Islam. Social inequalities followed these 
reformations supported by the effect of globalization as described previously, and caused 
people to create their informal networks to ensure their survival or to support their 
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interests. A combination of the losers and the beneficiaries but excluding the political 
elite from this reformation process, found a common ideological framework based upon 
religious identity.  The result was the creation of both informal networks and formal and 
strong ones such as the MUSIAD, which interact and cooperate for the interests of all in 
the name of common Islamic values. The economic interaction between MUSIAD and 
workers in Germany is a strong example of how these networks interfere and go beyond 
their own interests, and thus, provide the mobilizing structures and increase forces for the 
Islamic movement.  
J. CONCLUSIONS 
The above analysis is an effort to describe and provide explanations for the rise of 
political Islam in Turkey. Some important conclusions come to light following the data 
presented in this essay.  
It can be concluded from this analysis that the Islamic context was always 
included in Turkey’s politics and that it will be difficult to delete an Islamic past which 
dominated the Ottoman Empire for centuries. However, the electoral path of the Islamic 
political embodiment shows a clear increase after the 1980’s. This success was not, of 
course, just a matter of coincidence but rather it was the product of changes in both the 
domestic and international environment. 
A close investigation deduces that the Islamic revival in Turkey came as a result 
of opportunities provided to the movement. The first is the effect of globalization. The 
globalization processes created an environment of income inequalities. The result was the 
creation of two groups of people who remained excluded from the process and whose 
very existence was threatened by the processes, and those who were the beneficiaries and 
improved their economic power but remained excluded from the political elite. The 
Islamic movement came to combine and unite these groups under a common religious-
based political identity. 
The second factor contributing to the rise of Islam was military intervention. The 
military sought to legitimize its rule backed by Islamic values and expanded them in the  
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state machine. These actions included an increased budget for religious affairs and the 
expansion of religious schools that later transformed into sources for the expansion of 
political Islam. 
The third and relevant to military decisions was the imposition of a high electoral 
threshold of 10%. The above decision actually left many small parties removed from the 
political scene who turned their support to the Islamic party with very similar  social 
ideas or which was, at least, less hostile to their political beliefs. Ziya Onis asserts that 
the threshold imposed by the military in order to avoid party fragmentation seems an 
impediment to the strong reforms that must be taken in Turkey.33 However, the threshold 
might be an effort to keep outside the Kurdish political party (HADEP) from Parliament 
of which the members account for approximately less than 10% of the total votes. 
Moreover, the threshold not only failed to terminate party fragmentation but the political 
realm appeared more fragmented after that. It is also important to note that the electoral 
system using the threshold results in an unequal representation since the majority of the 
political parties remains outside of Parliament and did pass the threshold. An example is 
that during the last elections, only two parties surpassed the 10% threshold: the AKP with 
34.28 % and the Republican People's Party (CHP) with 19.40%. Thus, after the previous 
elections, 53.68% of the constituency won 100% of the seats while the remaining 46.32% 
do not have any representation whatsoever. 
These aforementioned issues, of course, raise questions about the real intensions 
of the military elite. Taking in account the frequent military interventions after WWII, it 
is possible to feel that the only beneficiary of the threshold is the military. The idea of a 
coup against the government, while at the same time almost half of the population 
remains without representation, is much easier than the case where the entire population 
is represented by the government is not without justice when inferring that only until now 
what this threshold supports is the strategic interests of the military elite. 
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No matter the intensions of the military, the continuing issue that their 
interventions either is to counterweight the left, or to stabilize the political life proved 
crucial for the revival of political Islam since they provided strong political opportunities. 
However, the success of the Islamic movement was not a product of opportunities alone.  
Effective mobilization accounts as well for the expansion of political Islam.  
Mobilization and recruitment, in this case, as with the entire Middle East resulted 
from the religious institutions. Moreover, the crucial factor here proved to be the 
education and religious schools which propagated greatly after the decision of the 
military elite to make religious education in primary and secondary schools mandatory 
and to increase the budget for religious affairs. Furthermore, the media was the decisive 
factor for bringing the message to a broader audience. Finally, and equally significant, 
was the informal networks that operated under the reciprocity relationship based upon 
religious identity whose purpose was to support the interests of the members of those 
networks. 
What is important, however, and might be the most impressive of the factors that 
helped the movement increase its constituencies, are the messages delivered. The 
movement actually showed great adaptive abilities by  remaining inside the political spirit 
of the era. The movement started with the message of “Islam is a solution”. Its initial 
effort was for a strong state and protectionist measures for the public. Recognizing the 
disparities in wealth and incomes, the party talked about social equality. However, having 
gained the support of a strong business association such as the MUSIAD and being aware 
of the situation in which social equality was infeasible, and moreover, with unwilling 
party supporters, the members of MUSSIAD, the movement turned its message to justice. 
The party thus managed to gain the support of both the loser and the winner of social 
disparity.  
The position that the party held about economic reforms and foreign affairs is also 
important. The initial opposition to the privatization of the state’s companies turned to 
supporting privatization when privatization seemed inevitable for the country to exit its 
economic crises, and why not, as this harmonization is along the lines of the goals of the  
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business interests that the party represents. By keeping ties to its previous positions, the 
party raised concerns about the conditions of the privatization and the protection of 
worker rights in the public enterprises.  
Regarding the EU, the party turned from a stance of strong opposition to a 
supporter of the integration. Its anti-Zionist motto also disappeared when the party 
participated in the coalition government with Tansu Chiler.  
The above behavior might raise questions about the real intensions of the party. 
Following the continued banning by military interventions, an assessment that the 
changing messages are coming as a venue for the party to avoid subsequent banning, will 
not be completely unjustifiable. However, no matter the deeper intensions, the party 
showed a great adaptability to the current political realm. More important is that its 
adaptability has to do with the message that actually is disseminated and which might be 
what is worrying the party: its Islamic orientation.  
From all the above issues, it can be inferred that the party seeks accommodation. 
This, of course, is not something new. Similar patterns have been adopted by other 
Islamic parties throughout the Middle East. This was the path for more fundamental 
political movements than the smooth, and at least non revolutionary or violent, Islamic 
movement in Turkey. Hisbolahs, for example, which seeks political power, and the 
Hamas enquiry towards political participation, or finally the Muslim Brotherhoods in 
Egypt, which seek access to state authority, highlight similar trends.    
Based on these aforementioned issues, the danger that the Islamic party poses 
toward the western orientation of the country might not be so great. In any case, what 
actually is being demonstrated is a continuous adaptation, which if it continues, will 
result in how the party loosen its ties to Islamic values and its appeal as something that 
can make a difference. In regards to this previous idea, it is important to note that the 
party has never actually governed the country. Its participation in the government was via 
a coalition governments in which it was a minor participant. Moreover, when the party 
was the major participant, it did not remain in power for long since the military 
intervened and ended its tenure.  
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Thus, the “Islamic solution” was never put to the test and likewise, was never 
infected. Moreover, the continuous banning by the military elite could be a factor that 
increases its constituencies simply as a reaction to differentiate depression and as a factor 
that can create identity. It has also been voiced that political Islam derives ammunition 
from the authoritarian conception of the state.34 
Hence, the impressive win of the AKP in the last elections is not a matter of luck.   
1. The AKP 
Of course, the prospects of the final incarnation of the AKP are appearing. The 
AKP gained the majority of the votes and succeeded in creating a powerful government 
having 363 of the total 550 seats. However, Islamic politics under the AKP appear 
differently both to the constituency and the leadership. 
The liberalization processes of the 1980’s have made the emergence of an Islamic 
media possible . The media has challenged the authority of the traditional ulema and 
helped in the creation of a new urban intellectual class able to preach its message to a 
large audience. Moreover, these intellectuals are critical of the ulema and accuse it of 
lacking the skills to handle contemporary social problems.35 There are also Islamic 
movements composed of followers of the Nurcu movement36 who dominate the Islamic 
communities. Prominent is the Gullen movement whose goal is the needs of the middle 
class and bourgeoisie. Moreover, it seeks to improve Turkey by using the market and 
education, it stresses the role of the merchants in improving Turkey and it emphasizes 
tolerance of other cultures.37 It appears, though, that a new stance and more enlightened 
approach towards Islam do exist.  
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The media and intellectuals also paved the way for the new Islamist generation 
open to new ideas on societal improvements.38 The above differentiation is more evident 
in the leadership. Tayyid Erdogan, the leader of AKP, appealed to the youth, the Islamic 
Yuppies and intellectuals.39  There is an emerging new class which remains moderate in 
its approach to politics. Erdogan also moved the party away from clientilistic politics and 
created horizontal ties among the people. Although the party continues to keep its Islamic 
stamp, the perception of the leadership and the new constituency might move it towards 
mainstream politics instead of identity politics as it was initially.  
As regards the EU project, the party appears now to have strong supporters.  This 
stance might have to do with the posture of the military. However, the party now appears 
to strive for a solution to the Cyprus issue that is one of the EU prerequisites.  The 
constituency also is being derived from a class with different ideas although they 
maintain Islamic values. Moreover, the support of entrepreneurship organizations seems 
to seek the economic advantages of EU integration. Thus, the Islamic factor for the 
western orientation of the country might not be a threat. Moreover, notwithstanding the 
results of the elections, and even if the idea that the supporters of the Islamic political 
movement will support a more radical Islamic solution is accepted, the majority of the 
population remains completely secular. Hence, the imposition of Islamic law and its 
derivatives for the country’s policy are all the more difficult. 
2. Conclusion 
The path of Islamic politics was highlighted as a threat for the orientation of the 
country. It is also believed that its increase could threaten the EU project and move the 
country towards the East. Although it appears to move with radical approaches, the 
movements turned to a moderate one. Its stance toward the EU seems now to be 
friendlier. An increased constituency might not be the product of the beliefs of the people 
that they must move toward the “Islam is the solution” idea, but a combination of many  
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other factors having to do with the inability of the other political parties, the worsening 
economic situation, the liberalization processes, and the causes and results of all these 
factors.  
The final product might be a movement that will lean towards the political arena 
relaxing its Islamic character. By following this type of path thus far, a party such as the 
Christian democrats, will be closer to characterizing the values of the current Islamic 
movement in Turkey as expressed by the main representative of the AKP. As such, its 
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III. TURKEY AND EUROPEAN UNION: THE ROLE OF THE 
MILITARY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Turkey’s efforts for EU integration began at the inception of modern Turkey. 
Kemal Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey, declared the creation of the Turkish 
republic and strived for the Europeanization of the country. The former prominent 
military figure became the first president of modern Turkey and declared Ismet Inonu as 
Prime Minister. 
Kemal Ataturk insisted that the military must not be involved in politics40, and 
Ismet Inonu helped to form an opposition party, and thus, the transformation to 
democratic politics occurred.41  However, since the first political party was created on a 
military basis, the role of the military was important in Turkish politics, and has remained 
so since then as is obvious from the three military interventions that occurred in modern 
Turkey and the recent silent coup in 1997.  
Besides the strong role towards political power, the military also sustained the 
western orientation of the first leader. Thus, the military appeared to be the guarantor for 
the modernization and westernization project of the country and justified its action and 
strong eye towards politics as the necessary course of action for keeping the country on 
its right course. Therefore, efforts towards integration with the EU were rather inline with 
the will of the westernization project executed mainly by the military. The transformation 
of the European Community to the European Union highlighted a clear shift in Europe 
towards political considerations. As a result, the following Copenhagen criteria were 
concerned about such political conditions. The candidacy of the country after the decision 
of the Helsinki summit implies that the country must be inline with these political 
criteria. Among them are the democratic institutions. Specifically in Turkey, the context 
of democracy derives from civil military relations. 
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Consequently, one of the main EU considerations is the role of the military in 
Turkish society, and specifically, civil military relations. Turkey’s military is very strong 
and is far from the European standard. Its prominent position creates doubts about the 
level of democracy in the country. The military in Turkey was the protector of the 
Kemalist legacy and the guarantor of the Westernization and modernization project. 
However, the implications of membership would entail important changes in Turkey’s 
military role since integration without change in its status is impossible. 
The current chapter explores the prospects of such a change to happen in order for 
the country to materialize its cornerstone policy–EU integration. Thus, the chapter 
includes an investigation of the role of the military since the inception of the modern 
Turkey in 1923. The chapter follows the events and important insights of the era until the 
first coup in 1960. Then, it continues with the implication of the 1971 and 1980 coups 
until the recent silent coup of 1997.  
Since the driving factor for the role of the military was the nationalism ideas that 
prevailed or were cultivated in Turkey, the chapter continues exploring this concept. 
Next, it provides some insights into the military- political interaction. There is also an 
assessment of the military stance in the modern Turkey, the effects of the growing civil 
society, the EU response to Turkey’s accession since it will be important for the final 
course of the military issue and the final conclusion about the military response to the EU 
challenge.  
1. 1960 Coup 
Turkey’s contemporary history and its alignment with western ideas started with 
the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey on October 29 1923. Mustafa Kemal, the 
father of modern Turkey, became the first President and appointed Ismet Inonu as Prime 
Minister. The former Sultanate was abolished and the Ottoman dynasty expatriated as 
incompatible with the principles of republicanism. 
Problematic from its inception due to differences in race and religion of the 
population that was incorporated into the new Republican state, the new establishment 
faced many early threats. Thus, a dangerous upheaval of Kurdish 1925 led by Sheikh 
Said and carried out in the name of Islam, forced Kemal to Introduce the Law for the 
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Maintenance that gave absolute power to the government.42 The foundation of the 
republic in 1923 was characterized by a strong spirit for secularization, and discard for 
the notion of an Islamic state. It is important to state that the rebellion occurred on 
religious terms and thus confirmed the fears of a religious reaction. It was due to such 
events that the republican regime established itself.43 
From the beginning, the dilemma was that a free representation could threaten the 
principles of the new state because it could cause the political activity of the old regime 
to act and lead to the prevalence of Islamic law. During this period, the important step for 
the transition to democratic rule happened in 1946 which actually ended the one party 
domination governing the country for almost 20 years. Opposition inside the Republican 
Peoples Party (RPP) regarding a land reform proposal created the initial impetus.  The 
current leader of RPP, Ismet Inonu, encouraged the opposition’s members to create their 
own party opening the way for a multiparty system and marking the start of a democratic 
process. However, this admission was given based on three points: the secural character 
of the state, its foreign policy, and primary education.44  
The Democratic party (DP) and the National Development party during this era 
was a result of this initiative. The transitional process was facilitated by the moderate 
voices of the RPP and mainly by the democratic inclination of the prominent figure of 
Ismet Inonu. During the following election, the DP won 53.3% of the votes and came to 
power marking the peaceful transition to a democratic sense of rule. Thus, a careful 
transition with the help of the state power or the state elite occurred. 
The transition might be a product of other factors. However, a notion exists that 
the state elite itself and the character of the new regime was important for this transition. 
Although the course of modern Turkey started with the absolutism of one party politics, 
the final transition to a more democratic rule was a product of the smooth character of the 
RPP regime and the final derivative of the Kemal reforms.45 
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Actually, there was not any important difference between the DP and RPP. The 
DP after the 1957 elections, responding to the declining constituency, introduced 
authoritarian measures against the opposition. Additionally, the clash between the DP and 
the state elite started when the latter used religion to garner votes.46 The following public 
unrest resulted in military intervention on 27 May 960. The reasons results from the 
legacy of the members of the DP who were former members of RPP because they learned 
to rule without opposition, and the conflict between the DP and public bureaucracy, 
which also experienced a loss of political power and income under the DP 
governorship.47 
The 1960’s coup was carried out by middle ranking officials as opposed to the 
1980 coup which was executed by high ranking officials. There were also extreme voices 
inside the military who wanted the establishment of permanent military rule. However, 
the moderates prevailed and democracy was restored in both cases. In the 1960’s, the 
military’s National Unity Committee (NUC) collaborated with the main opposition party 
while in the second case, the military did not collaborate with any political party but 
proscribed all of them and permitted only three new members to participate in the 1983 
elections.48 
The 1961 constitution also created the National Security Council (NSC), with the 
participation of the highest commanders of the Armed Forces, who provided the military 
with a legal way to formulate national security policies.49 The NSC to today still remains 
part of the military’s involvement in Turkey’s political life. However, the 1960 coup 
occurred mainly to resolve a constitutional crisis but no serious amendments were made 
to the country’s constitution that retained a liberal notion.  
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2. 1971 Coup 
The liberal notion of the constitution by 1960 coup encouraged the emergence of 
new political parties to Turkey’s political scene. The Justice Party (JP) and the New 
Turkey Party appeared on the scene and both claimed to be the successor of the DP.  It is 
important to note that the parties garnered more votes than the DP while the performance 
of the RP decreased from 41% to 37%. These results could indicate the reaction of the 
constituency to military intervention.   
In 1964, Suleyman Demirel was elected chairman of the JP to replace the former 
chairman, Ragid Gumuspala, who passed away. The JP gained the majority of the votes 
in the 1965 elections (53%) and came to power. Its tenure from 1965 to 1971 was one of 
the most successful periods in Turkey which was characterized by a decrease in inflation 
and high development rates. Moreover, there was a substantive increase in the freedom of 
the press while the arrests of people for cases of freedom of thought were significantly 
minimized. 
However, the liberal notion of the constitution facilitated the appearance of 
extreme movements ranging from the far left to the far right.50 In addition, the students 
demonstrations which started in France in 1968 influenced similar movements in other 
countries and created strong reactions in Turkey. Under these circumstances, physical 
and political violence have increased and the 1971 coup by memorandum against the JP 
with Suleiman Demirel happened because the government was unable to handle the 
budding political situation. The coup came as warning to avoid the establishment of a 
military regime sustained by frustrated army officials.51  
The memorandum led to the creation of a technocratic government according to 
the guidance of the military. Political violence was decreased and the constitution was 
revised to strengthen executive power but also limited civil liberties in the name of 
limiting the chances for political violence. However, the JP also wanted to make changes  
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to the constitution that were introduced by the memorandum. Moreover, the coup’s 
constitutional amendments gave law-making powers to military authorities while 
enhancing its autonomy by excluding itself from review by civilian courts.52 
Following a period where martial law was declared in the country, the 1973 
election actually terminated the 1971 intervention. Important changes happened during 
this period in RPP where Bulent Ecevit replaced Ismet Inonu as the president of the party. 
During the elections, no party could gain the majority of the votes and a period of 
coalition governments started. Ecevit cooperated with the Islamic orientation National 
Salvation Party (MSP) and formed the government. 
The coalition’s tenure was marked by military intervention in Cyprus and the 
occupation of part of the island. The operation worsened the relationship with Europe and 
created impediments for its accession to the Community. The economic situation also 
was bad due to the oil crisis and the embargo applied by the U.S. as a result of the 
intervention. 
With the worsening political situation, the DP appeared again under the leadership 
of Suleiman Demirel and formed a coalition government under the name of the 
Nationalist Front which remained in power until 1977. The second effort for a coalition 
government after the 1977 election was unsuccessful and Ecevit returned to the 
governorship forming his coalition government with RPP leadership. In 1979, the power 
shifted again to Demirel who formed a coalition government with the support of the MSP 
and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The worsening political situation led to 
military intervention which came after a warning to the military parties to handle the 
situation. 
3. 1980 Coup 
Thus, the intervention appeared as a solution to political chaos. Again, as in the 
previous coups, the military facilitated the transition to democracy. The year 1960 was 
mainly to resolve a constitutional crisis and did not introduce any political changes as 
opposed to 1980 where the NSC introduced many laws regarding the political and social 
structure of the country. Deeper reasons for the 1980 coup was the failure of the import  
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substitution strategy which created a severe economic crisis. The fear of communism also 
created an antidote to authoritarian tendencies. As a result, the longer duration of the 
coup created social and economical structural changes. 
The1980 coup is also ascribed as a result of the government’s inability to cope 
with the increasing political violence and terrorism even if martial law was in effect in 
much of the country. In 1979, Ecevit lost the election and offered support to the winner of 
the JP in order to create a government.  However, Demirel preferred the support of the 
NSP and NAP.  Some express the view that military intervention could be avoided if the 
two major parties could cooperate to form a government.53  
A difference between the constitution in 1960 and 1982 is that the latter gave 
important powers to the president as opposed to the political parties. The president could 
appoint the court judges and the university administrations maintaining the power of the 
military to the judiciary and education system. In general, the constitution was designed 
to maintain the power of the military in Turkey’s political life.54 
The coup ended with the parliamentary elections in 1983, won by Turgut Ozal, 
while General Evren became President of the country. In the following years, Ozal 
adopted a liberalization policy which revived the economy of the country. At this time, a 
revival of the political elite also occurred. 
Ozal became President and Demirel returned to politics as Prime Minister of a 
coalition government of his True Path Party (DYP) and the Social Democratic Party and 
later as President of the country. In this period, the pro Islamic Welfare party (RP) rose 
under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. The next chapter examines in detail the 
implication and course of Islamic politics.  
In 1997, Europe rejected Turkey’s candidacy which cause the deterioration of the 
relationship between the two parties. The year 1997 was also marked with the February 
28 coup which ended the tenure of the Welfare party. The rest period is characteristic for 
its political instability and the worsening economic situation and the coalition 
governments. The coalition government with Mesut Yilmaz as Prime Minister lasted 
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from 1997 to 1998, and with Bulent Ecevit from 1999 to 2002. The coalition 
governments were formed from the center right ANAP, the center left DSP, and the 
nationalist MHP, which was the longest coalition government in Turkish history. They 
stayed in power despite their policy failures and created the greatest economic crisis in 
Turkey. They called for elections in November 200255 and the ANAP saved the prospects 
for the EU to institute reforms for the elections when a serious reform package passed to 
bring Turkey in line with the EU aquis.  
Also, there is the banning of Virtue party, the successor of Welfare party, by the 
state elite, and its member’s split to the SP and AKP under the leadership of Tayyip 
Erdogan. The military seems to remain strong to observe the course of action of the new 
pro-Islamic government of the AKP which came to power after the 2002 elections. It 
continues also to control everything that it thinks will threaten Kemalism principles, 
which have thus far formed Turkey’s policy.  
B. MODERNIZATION AND IDENTITY 
The military’s commitment to the country’s political life was not only a simple 
process. Turkey was created under a threatened environment. Following the decadence of 
the Ottoman empire and the results of WWII, the territory was facing collapse. Under 
these circumstances, Kemal strove to accomplish the creation of the new Turkey. The 
first path was strewn with many fights against both internal and external enemies. In such 
a threatened environment, Turkey felt that it had been a country that was constantly 
threatened. This perception was a reason for the military’s prevalence and determined the 
choices made by the modernizers for the course of a modern Turkey. Another 
characteristic of Turkey’s society was the absence of landlords so that no important 
power could challenge the absolutism of the state along its first path. Thus, the division 
between the state class and the masses was perpetuated.56   
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The Sèvres Treaty talked about the disintegration of the Ottoman empire and 
made the creation of a Kurdish country possible. From the moment the country was 
created, it had to fight against Kurdish resurgence. Thus, the Kurdish issue was always 
regarded as a leading threat. The Kurdish issue is an old concern for the country and one 
of the reasons that lead to the military prevalence in Turkey.57 
Moreover, the rebellion happened under religious terms and confirmed the fears 
of a religious reaction. Under these circumstances, the legacy that brings suspicion to 
Islamic issues and mainly Islamic politics is not unexcused. Such events shaped the role 
of the military in Turkey.  
Thus, this perception of a constantly threatened environment was the driving 
factor for nationalism in Turkey. The military protector of the new state was the 
guarantor of its territorial integrity and both the creator and spokesperson of Turkish 
nationalism.   
The military is ascribed as the reactionary nationalist movement that uses the 
theme of national survival in a dramatized way. Mainly, the Army expresses the official 
nationalism or Ataturk nationalism and is in crisis “due to the difficulty of balancing the 
tension between the French-style conception of nationalism, based on the principle of 
citizenship and territoriality, and ethnicist variations.”58 
Turkey tried to transform the nation culturally while, at the same time, retain its 
distinctiveness. Imposition of a total identity was difficult since there were both ethnic 
and religious variations. Additionally, Turkey’s nationalism and the creation of identity 
was a project that started from above by the elite. This was a top down and not a bottom 
up approach.59  
The masses in Turkey remained passive recipients of the nationalist message 
propounded by the elite. Participation in the nationalist movement could have provided 
the unifying experience required for allegiance to the new regime.60 
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However, nationalist ideas are not inherently characteristic of the Turkish society. 
Although there is a sense that the country is under threat, which leads to a sense that 
increases nationalism instincts, this is not a product of self-perception but is something 
that is cultivated via the curricula of the secular schools.61 
Thus, the creation of nationalism was a derivative of the state’s policy which 
managed in this way to assert its necessity for the integrity and its position as the 
guarantor of Turkish identity. Under these conditions, it became possible for the 
nationalist elites to treat the construction of history and identity in an entirely 
instrumental fashion.62 
However, the perception of identity was not stable. The military, despite the fact 
that they were supposed to support Kemalism principles, help in the rise of Islam in 
Turkey’s society. They argue that “Kemalism failed to provide a new identity for Turks 
and created an identity crisis by divorcing them from Islam.” They introduced religious 
courses at schools, purged left-wing members from the educational system and created a 
pro-religion stance.63  They also transgressed the static and the state centric perception of 
Kemal. The liberalization process following the 1980 coup is an example of this.  
C. PATERNALISTIC POLITICS: STATE POLITICAL ELITE 
INTERACTION 
The investigation of modern Turkey’s political life highlights the strong presence 
of the military and the lesser representation of the political elite. From its inception, the 
military appears to intervene to correct the mistakes of the political elite and to restore 
order. Thus, the political –state elite interaction deserves a closer examination. Turkey 
has had 18 free elections from its inception; however, many do not believe that the 
country has a real democracy. Thus far, the country has faced many difficult times both 
politically but mainly economical. The military interventions appeared in any case as the 
only way for the country to exit the crisis.  
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This could be ascribed to the inability of the political elite. However, from the 
beginning of the Republican state, a special relationship existed between the military and 
political elite. Do not forget that the first party was created by a military leadership. 
Although reform ideas and the commitment of some people to democracy, such as Ismet 
Inonou, led to the multiparty politics in 1946, the military always kept a powerful 
position behind the scenes and was always ready to intervene.  
Thus, the first coup was easy and stabilized the power of the military elite with 
the creation of the NSC in 1961. Following the coup, the political parties appeared to be 
under the will of this elite, and in many cases, they strived mainly to gain military support 
in order to remain in power.  
Closer to the second coup, politicians appeared to complain to military 
commanders about the behavior of their leaders.64  Some parties also insisted on the 
proclamation of martial law to gain the sympathy of the army.65  The reason for the coup 
in 1971 was to restore the political chaos. Some assert that the coup would have avoided 
if the two stronger parties had cooperated. Cooperation would had led to the creation of a 
strong government, and therefore, intervention would be unnecessary. However, as 
Demirel, the leader of one party said, since the military wanted to intervene nothing could 
stop it.66 Moreover, cooperation was not so easy since one party represented the left and 
the other the right. Finally, Demirel won the election with 45% of the votes, a percentage 
that is not small for a strong government. Compared to the elections after 1987 or the 
current government which is the majority and won with 35% of the votes, Demirel’s 
situation, is in any case, far better. A slight modification to constitution could restore the 
situation and lead to the creation of a strong government. 
The situation is not better in the current context. The National Security Council 
dominates political scene and determines the policies and priorities. Erbakan signed his 
government’s death warrant by not understanding that NSU recommendations are 
actually orders and must be implemented immediately.67 Moreover, after the banning of 
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his party, Erbakan asked his followers to not even protest something that declared the 
special relationship between the military and the political elite.68 Additionally, the 
reformist camp in the Islamic political movement, represented by the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), recognized that they must not clash with the military.69 
The above relation declares who is the employee and who is the employer. The 
political elite, although it is the formal government of the state, appears not to have any 
real power. In such circumstances, the fact that it resorted to paternalistic politics is not 
unexcused. Since the political elite was threatened by the military, it was very difficult 
for it to relinquish patronage politics. The political elite has short-term goals and does not 
introduce reforms that will reduce the power of the military elite but chooses network ties 
and clientilistic politics as the only way to remain in the government.70 
The instability of the political system after the 1980 coup caused the politicians to 
be influenced and follow the will of social interest groups in order to secure their 
position.71  Thus, political patronage became the basic strategy for obtaining votes and 
religion was frequently used for this purpose. On the other hand, the state elite and 
military have been the driving factor for the Westernization of society and they have 
complete autonomy in their policies from all the other groups, the political elite 
included.72. 
During the course of modern Turkey, Ozal was the only politician who decreased 
the influence of the Army during its tenure and also became the first civilian president in 
1989 since the era of Celal Bayar.73 The period during Ozal’s tenure experienced low 
inflation rates, much development and a liberalization process which increased the 
country’s economy. However, what Ozal succeeded in accomplishing in state – political 
interactions later turned in favor of the military once again. Economic performance 
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decreased while in some cases moved towards an economic crisis and the military 
appeared at this time to be more assertive to its will. Ozal’s successors had neither the 
ability nor the favorable circumstances to do this.74 
D. PRESENT SITUATION 
1. Assessments 
a. Military Changing Its Position because of Threats 
From the time modern Turkey was created, the state elite remained the 
same with the exception of the ulema. Thus, the traditional dichotomy between the center 
and periphery strengthened under the authoritarian policy. The political elite was limited 
by the military’s values. The democratic values have been subservient to the value of the 
state. The 1982 constitution declared that secularism, the principle of nationalism and the 
republican character, cannot be changed.75 
Although the military assert itself as the guarantor of the Kemalist legacy, 
events demonstrate that its commitment to this legacy was not stable. Actually, the 
military stayed in power longer and was contradictory to Kemalist principles, such as the 
case of Islam support in the 1980’s and the liberalization of the economy. Hence, the 
Kemalist legacy is not a stable principle in the Army but it handles as it sees fit.76  
The military faced the threat of the Kurds in the name of Islam. The 
modernization project, additionally, had to be conducted with the suppression of Islamic 
forces. Thus, the military appeared to suppress Islam during each inception. However, the 
1980 coup shows a completely different path. Using the excuse to counter weight the left, 
the military backed Islam to introduce changes to the curricula of the schools 
emphasizing the importance of religion. This pro Islamic stance of Evren and Ozal 
contributed to the rise of political Islam in the country. Later, when the left had been 
discredited by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the military was necessary to protect the 
country from the Islamic threat.  
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It appears, though, that the military is always present and must remain 
strong as the only power that can fight threats but threats that the military itself has 
helped to create in some cases. The situation is similar to the military and political elite 
interaction. The military always arrives to correct the situation and restore order in a 
difficult way that the inability and the corruption of the political elite created. However, 
the political elite was never powerful enough to introduce reforms that could handle a 
difficult situation or to enhance the democratization process better. 
A difficult political environment also exists where the political elite is 
under siege. When the economy and security are proceeding well, the position of the 
political elite could strengthen. However, when the things turn sour, their appreciation 
decreases. The situation might be more intense than before. The 1980 coup imposed a 
territorial threshold in order to increase the strength of political parties and to reduce 
fragmentation.77 However, the party system became more fragmented. Moreover, it 
resulted in coalition governments who all strive for their constituency. Additionally, it 
could result in unequal representation as happened in the final 2002 elections. A 
government was formed by 53% of the people while the majority remains without any 
representation at all. 
Under these circumstances, if things will turn sour, military intervention 
will be likely be desirable by the majority of the people since it will be the only way to 
change the government. Thus, it seems that a vicious circle is perpetuated where the 
military always strives to restore the situation but always remains also as the reason for 
this situation that it comes to restore, and the resolver always has the support of the 
people. For example, many have praised the military for its stance towards the Islam.  
b. The Emerging Civil Society? 
It is true that until now, the military continues to enjoy the support of 
Turkey’s society. However, this society has to show a growing level of maturity. This 
maturity is also evident by the result of the election after Ozal’s era in which the 
preferences in political parties changed to a large degree. It can be inferred that people do 
not remain loyal along political lines, but they punish, or appraise the political parties 
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according to their performance, mainly in economic issues. This might be a product of 
the liberalization process of the 1980’s or the increasing role of the media, but in any 
case, shows an evolution in Turkey’s democratization path.78 
The transformation of the economy and the increase of the private sector 
also influenced the preferences of young Turks. Although state employees or military 
officers are greatly respected, the youth now seem more likely to seek jobs in the 
business world.79 
Furthermore, the military is a prominent economical factor and investment 
factor in Turkey’s economy.80 Therefore, accusations about the political elite’s 
mismanagement that created the economic crisis in Turkey while the military stays clear 
are not unquestionably accepted by civil society.  
On the other hand, the liberalization processes of the 1980s paved the way 
for new elites to appear on the political scene. The expansion of the media also largely 
contributed to the appearance of new voices, and in many cases, are coming out against 
the military position. Thus, the continuation of the current situation is not easy for the 
state elite. Moreover, entrepreneurship organizations, which were pro-military appeared 
now to be strong supporters of the EU which makes the military stance more difficult. 
The strong secular entrepreneurship organization (TUSSIAD) which 
helped the 1980 military coup is now a stronger supporter of democratization and EU 
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The Helsinki summit which also raised hopes for integration provided the 
opportunity for a stronger commitment towards the implementation of the measures. In 
such an environment, the military position comes into question. Some voices from the 
political elite started to imply that the national security issue was handled by the military 
in order to assert its position in civilian affairs.82  
Pragmatically, the national security issues remained the strong 
impediments to the democratization process. For example, the Army always points at the 
threat of Kurdish and Islamic resurgence. It was impossible to have an organization that 
supported matters on the Kurdish issue under the constitution of 1982.83 However, the 
suppression of this issue has important effects on human rights. This is an important 
aspect for Europe, and moreover, a sensitive issue in the United States regarding politics 
in Turkey. In 1994, a veteran congressman responded “You’ve been telling me that for 25 
years!” when he was informed that human rights in Turkey were improving.84 
However, a real improvement has occurred in such aspects in recent years. 
The reformation package that was passed by the government is also important, which 
allows the use of Kurdish.85  
The problem is that the Army continues to determine what the threat is. 
With the capture of Ocalan, Islamism became the first priority of these threats.86 The rise 
of the AKP in the government in the 2002 elections, combined with a strong victory since 
it gained the majority of the seats, is of great concern for the military. The military issued 
its warning against the government raising security concerns regarding Cyprus and EU  
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policies, and the possibility of Islamic rule. Confrontation with the military is a 
possibility. Opinion makers did not support the military’s message and some feel that a 
confrontation might be better for the democratization process.87 
The current situation appears to be highly unstable. The political elite 
strives to bring reforms that will be inline with EU recommendations, the military raises 
security issues and stresses the Islamic threat, and a representative party of Islamic 
politics holds power. This stressful environment was marked by the refusal of Turkey to 
allow the use of bases by U.S. forces during the Iraqi Freedom operation, which 
disproved the prediction of Carol Migdalovitz and highlighted the assessment by Ian O. 
Lesser regarding the predictability of Turkey’s foreign policy.88 
The path of politics in Turkey also highlights some important points. The 
initial one party politics successfully paved the way for further democratization of the 
country when it allowed different voices to form their political parties, and thus creating 
the multiparty era. This, of course, happened because the state elite admitted such an 
outcome. The process also has been facilitated by the prevalence of moderate voices in 
both the government and the opposition. These moderate voices and the strong 
commitment to democracy of people such as Ismet Inonu, who belonged to the state elite, 
show that the military view is not a monolithic one. 
The first coup in 1960 also appeared as a restoration to democratic rule. 
Moreover, it created a liberal spirit in Turkey which lived during one of the most free 
periods in its political life. Here again, although some of the military members insisted on 
the imposition of martial law, the moderates prevailed and made the transition to 
democratic rule possible.                                                   
87 Ibid., p. 92. See also Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba, Rethinking Modernity and National 
Identity In Turkey.”  The author asserts that when nationalism is the ideological environment of 
modernization, it is the state elites who have to be defeated in order for modernization from above to be a 
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October 2002, p. CRS-6.  Ian O. Lesser assessed that Turkey is at a crossroads. Successful economic 
reforms could lead to political reforms. On the other hand, the failure to introduce political reforms and 
dismantle the elements of the Kemalist state could exacerbate the conflict inside Turkey’s society and 
render Turkey a less stable and predictable ally. Ian O. Lesser “Turkey, Greece, and the U.S. in a Changing 
Strategy Environment: Testimony before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on 
Europe,” p. 3.  Actually, a large majority of the population (about 90%) did not approve of the involvement 
in the war. 
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The same results are appearing after the 1980 coup. Although the 
intervention according to the military was seen as a necessity to restore the inability of 
the political parties and the worsening situation, and even if they could keep their 
position in the government, they decided not to do so and facilitated the free elections in 
1983. The period also started with the liberalization policies of Ozal, which enhanced the 
country’s economy and was marked by the increase of the political elite’s prestige and its 
relative position vis-à-vis the military.  
Thus, it is true that such moderate voices do exist in the. They also seem 
to act according to circumstances and are able to take the situation i hand but are also 
able to transmit the power when their full engagement in governorship is no longer 
necessary. They always, however, maintain a strong position behind the scenes and are 
always ready to intervene when things turn sour in their judgment.  
Their engagement is achieved either with their support or cooperation with 
some parties, as was the case after the first coup in 1960, or with their direct guidance for 
the country’s policy using institutional power, such as the NSC. Nonetheless, their 
position is always constitutionally based. Their commitment so far, whether successful or 
unsuccessful, was desirable in some cases. However, the Turkish corner stone policy, the 
EU accession, cannot go forward if the military continues to enjoy its current status.  
2. EU Interaction 
This is not negotiable and the only way for the country to be successful is for the 
military to accept a far less prominent role in the alignment with the standards of the 
West. Since Turkey has the power to do so, the final decision seems to be its own. To the 
extent that the military understands this, the better the future of Turkey, its accession to 
the EU, and its alignment to the western standards, and to the extent that moderate voices 
will prevail, such an outcome will be a possibility. 
In order, however, for this to actually occur, the military must be convinced of the 
benefits of accession. First of all, they must be convinced of the EU’s intensions. Voices 
already doubt the real interests of the EU and they believe that the EU will always find 
something to reassess and postpone concerning the Turkish accession.  
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However, the case for integration is not only a one way street.. The EU also has to 
participate.  The EU must assert and continuously voice its interest in Turkish candidacy. 
This is much more important now that Turkey is at a crossroads. Until now, Europe’s 
response has not always been encouraging. Opinions stated such as from the Prime 
Minister of Luxemburg that torturers could not sit at the EU table are only a factor that 
strengthens the questions in Turkey over which path it should follow.89  
Also, the military does have its reasons for taking such cases seriously since 
whatever efforts that have to be done implies a decrease in its long standing rights. Thus, 
a response of the type that “EU will never accept Turkey and Turkey must search for new 
allies”90 comes as a natural derivative and creates impediments to any reforms. 
Moreover, it threatens the long-standing orientation of the country, which is of great 
concern when taking in account Turkey’s strategic importance. 
Such a climate has created two different groups in Turkey, the integralists who are 
now pro EU and the gradualist who want to appear to be skeptical about the reforms that 
need to be introduced in Turkey for the purpose of EU integration.91 Such an outcome, of 
course, will likely perpetuate as far as the military which is not sure of EU intensions, and 
means that they will stop in the other case. No matter the outcome, the EU factor is of 
great importance in the creation of a framework, which will facilitate the transition if this 
is ever to come to pass. 
E. CONCLUSION 
There is a sense that the role of the military is changing in Turkish society and 
this will likely change more under the pressure of modernization and the growing civil 
society.92 Undisputedly, the military is still in a prominent position in Turkey’s political 
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life. So far, the military was the custodian of the Kamalist legacy, and in some cases, 
appeared as the supporter of democratization and mainly the western orientation of the 
country. Its full commitment to western ideas was the crucial factor for Turkish 
cooperation with the West.  
The military’s interventions also has been justified as needed to eliminate threats 
having to do with the leftist forces or Islamic forces which could threaten the long-
standing western orientation. In such cases, its commitment was desirable since Turkey 
was always and continued to be of great strategic importance.  
The strong eye on the Turkey’s politics is understandable since the country faces 
or perceives to face many threats both internally but also internationally. The Kurdish 
issue was and continues to be one of great concern for the country, and the prevalence of 
Islamic forces could threaten its policy orientation and reverse the current pro-western 
stance, something that is undesirable, of course, for the West. 
As long as these cases are perceived as great threats, the military stance will be 
unlikely to change. As long as the political elite seems to not have the ability to act and 
policies are not stable, the military will be always there to restore the situation. The 
course shows, however, that society is ready for a real democracy, there are fewer 
military supporters and the entrepreneurship elite seems to want EU accession. Under 
these circumstances, the continuation of the military’s prominent role comes into 
question. The military however, remains strong and a possibility of another intervention 
and its stabilization in Turkey’s politics is not unlikely. Moreover, confrontation with 
political elites is not unlikely and although some believe that confrontation could be 
better for the democratization process, the military enjoyed and continues to enjoy great 
support from the people.93 Thus, a confrontation will be likely to bring the military to the 
fore at least in the short term.  
Nonetheless, the military thus far has followed a moderate path. The prevalence 
of the moderates during the first period and the prominent figure of Inonu enabled the 
transition to a multiparty rule although they could do not do so. The prevalence of 
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moderates also enabled the peaceful transition to democracy in the following two coups 
and thus avoided the imposition of permanent martial law. To the extent that the 
moderates will prevail again in the current military establishment, a positive outcome will 
be likely.  
However, Turkey felt in many cases that its strategic concerns are threatened by 
these reforms. Thus, the outcome will likely be to interfere with how these reform threats 
are perceived. Hence, the outcome does not only result from Turkey’s intensions. The EU 
must, in turn, provide additional guarantees for the integrity of the country. The help of 
the EU is completely desirable in this difficult phase. First, the EU must declare its 
support and its strong desire for Turkish integration. Policies which do not declare this 
support will continuously exaggerate the bad climate. Declarations such as Turkey is a 
big problem does not help but only make the possibility of any reform more difficult. 
The United States also could help Turkey in this difficult path. Although the real 
objection of United States could be not the integration but the convergence of Turkey 
with the EU standard94, the Turkish commitment to democracy could be inline with the 
Bush security strategy and provide a clear paradigm for democracy in a Muslim country. 
Additionally, the democratization process could bring Turkey inline with the Western 
standard and become a predictable ally as Ian O. Lesser supports. 
To the extent that such help of both the EU and the United States will be provided 
to the Turkish current crossroad phase and to the extent that the moderates will prevail on 
the military elite, an alignment with the Western standard military position and a 
transition to a real democracy could materialize. To the extent that this commitment will 
not happen and extremes will prevail in the military, the military will continue to 
dominate Turkish political life. Additionally, since the military stokes the fires of the 
nationalistic mood and the threats that the country faces, it is possible to even see the 
creation of such threats in order for the military to assert itself and sustain its importance  
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and its position. In such a case, the accession to the EU will postponed for the time being, 
and the destabilization of the area will be more likely. This, of course, is not in the 
interests of the West.  
The military continues to be the stronger factor in Turkish politics. Its position 
creates impediments to the democratization process and also other important aspects for 
EU accession as democracy and human rights seem to be a derivative of its status. 
Considering its strong position, the military will be by far the most decisive factor in the 




IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND KURDS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS TO 
EU ACCESSION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council, the Member States created an 
important framework for the accession of new members. Thus, the subsequent 
enlargement must be enacted according to the criteria inside this new framework. The 
decision was that every country in Eastern and Central Europe desiring to become a 
member could do so. As a result, the question became not whether a country would 
become a member but how will this be done.  The criteria according to the framework 
imply that the countries need to satisfy certain economic and political requirements.  The 
Member States also have designed the membership criteria, known as the Copenhagen 
criteria.  
The political criteria as adopted in Copenhagen require that the candidate country 
achieve stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities.95 Additionally, the candidate member has to 
prove the “ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the 
political, economic and monetary”96 goals the union has created. In other words, the 
country must provide the necessary administrative structures for the effective 
implementation of the European Community legislation through these structures.  
Turkey as a candidate member must comply with these criteria. Human rights and 
minority rights were one of the most sensitive issues in Turkey’s effort for accession. 
Turkey’s concerns result from feelings of insecurity coming to the fore if these measures 
must be taken. One of the main reasons for this insecurity derives from the large Kurdish 
population and the fact that some adopted violent and separatist movements. It is 
estimated that approximately 8 to 24 million Kurds live in Turkey. This is very 
significant proportion taking into account that Turkey’s population is 69,626,000 which 
means that 1 out of 8 or 1 out of 3 is of Kurdish origin. Human rights is also a significant 
issue for the same reasons in Turkey. The current chapter explores Turkey’s efforts 
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concerning these criteria, the treatment and importance of the Kurdish issue for the 
country and the implications of both the Kurds and human rights for the accession of 
Turkey to the EU. Specifically, the chapter explores the progress of Turkey towards these 
issues since the Helsinki summit and assesses the steps and the implications of these steps 
for the possibility of future membership.  
B. THE KURDISH ISSUE 
The chance to create a Kurdish independent state occurred after the end of WWI. 
The Treaty of Sevres in 1920 planned the formation of this state. However, it was 
suppressed three years later by the Treaty of Lausanne. The Allies accepted the 
annexation of most of Kurdistan to the new Turkish state, and the remainder of the 
territory was divided between Iran, Iraq and Syria.97  
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey, never recognized the 
Treaty of Serves,. Mustafa Kemal started the national war of liberation in 1919. In his 
effort to mobilize support from all ethnicities in Turkey’s territory, he stressed the 
common religious bonds between the Kurds and Turks. An emphasis on religion also 
existed in the National Pact Adopted in January 1920, a document considered the 
Declaration of Independence of the Turkish Nation. The term nation, used to denote a 
community of believers, was utilized to assert an identity that incorporated all the Islamic 
groups with different ethnic backgrounds in Turkey.98 
From the beginning, the Kurds did not have the right to use their language except 
at home. The Turkish government also helped to create untruth scholarly studies aimed at 
proving that Kurdish was ancient Turkish that actually now does not exist, that Kurds are 
Turks who were corrupted by Iranian influence, and that Kurdish is actually a Turkic 
dialect and so forth.99  
Since the Kurds considered themselves a different ethnicity and the memories of 
the Treaty of Serves were still fresh in their minds, an uprising for independence would 
first years of Modern Turkey. Pragmatically, from the early be highly probable during the                                                  
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era, one of the greatest threats for the new regime was the rebellion in the Spring of 1995 
led by Said Shaikh, a Kurdish religious leader. The rebellion appeared to be a religious 
uprising. However, many assert that nationalist ideas and other enhanced it, and that it 
was primarily a nationalist movement. In such an environment in which the new country 
was striving to assert and stabilize its position, the rebellion was considered a strong 
threat. Since then, the possibility of any other Kurdish uprising remained one of the 
government’s great concerns. As such, any provisions or acts that could give rise to this 
threat was deliberately avoided while the establishment tried to increase the sense of 
Turkish nationalism and impose the image of Turkish identity on all Muslims. However, 
some argue that the development of Kurdish Nationalism resulted from Turkish 
Nationalism.100  
Other Kurdish uprisings occurred until 1939, but none were serious, and the 1950 
elections were carried out without any evidence of Kurdish Nationalism. However, the 
liberal constitution of 1960 created the possibility  for some Kurds to begin to become 
aware of their ethnicity. The late 1960’s saw the formation of organizations because of an 
increasing awareness of the problems of Eastern Anatolia. The goal of these 
organizations appeared to be the recognition of the Kurdish language and Kurdish 
cultural rights. The coup in 1971 halted the operation of these organizations, but later in 
the middle 1970’s, some with radical and leftist ideas appeared and asserted the rights of 
a separate nation. The prominent and more radical among them was the PKK, which was 
organized in 1977 in Diyarbakir by Abdullah Ocalan. The early operations of the PKK 
were limited to small-scale armed conflicts and were stopped by military intervention in 
1980, forcing the leadership to flee aboard. The PKK resumed operations in 1984. 
Turkey’s response was strong and swift. The constitution was amended to react against 
the threatening case of Kurdish resurgence. Law 2983 banned the use of Kurdish and 
took measures to increase Turkish nationalism and suppress Kurdish nationalism. 
However, the measures proved fruitless since the PKK increased its violent operations 
while some feel that state repression was more effective for recruitment than PKK 
propaganda.101 
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During Ozal’s governorship, there was shift action concerning the Kurdish issue. 
Ozal declared that he was also of Kurdish origin and Suleiman Demirel in 1992, as prime 
minister, announced that he recognized the Kurdish ethnic presence in Turkey. The ban 
on the Kurdish language had been lifted a year before in April 1991.  
Thus, the Kurdish issues were once again the focal point with many controversial 
opinions regarding its emancipation. Many in the armed forces and the National Security 
Council (NSC) believe that no Kurdish question exists in Turkey., and there is only a 
terrorist problem and have opted for a military solution. However, such a policy seems 
unlikely to bear fruit in the long term. Others assert that a political solution will be better 
for this problem.102 
Arguably, a concession on this issue will improve Turkey’s international image. 
One of the greatest challenges for Turkey is the adjustment of policies towards the 
Kurdish population.  The Kurdish issue as an aspect of Turkish and EU relations is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. Before the 1980’s, few in Europe were interested in the 
Kurds. The first chance for the popularization of the Kurdish issue was the use of 
chemical weapons by the Iraqi government against the Kurdish town of Halabja.103 
The impact of the Kurdish issue before 1994 was driven mainly by the small 
states of the EU. This is ascribed to the fact that small states are a strong lobby for human 
rights and democracy in foreign affairs. These states have been the most critical against 
Turkey when it started a military operation in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1995. However, with the 
materialization of the Copenhagen criteria, the implications for Turkey from the 
Luxemburg Summit, and later with the acceptance of candidacy at the Helsinki Summit, 
the Kurdish situation became an important issue for EU members. 
The large Kurdish population and the difficulties posed by the Kurdish issue to 
Turkey has become a subject of literature in many cases. Projects about Kurds have 
contributed to the detailed examination of the subject providing their opinion for a 
possible viable solution. Voices vary from pessimism asserting that ethnic conflict cannot 
d to optimistic ones, which assert that democracy could be resolved but only manage
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provide a solution. Some also suggest that the problem could be resolved by having 
strong political figures in Turkey willing to undertake the necessary reforms, while others 
point out the absence of real support for HADEP (People’s Democratic Party, a pro-
Kurdish party in Turkey), in the capital cities might suggest a possibility of real 
assimilation of the Kurdish people.104 
Nonetheless, Turkey has continuously confronted this issue. The Turkish army 
fought a 15-year war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Turkey’s Kurdish 
questions are attributed to the socio-economic backwardness of the southeast region. The 
difference in development in these areas enables the General staff to detangle the Turkish 
problem from the lack of democracy, and connect it to the underdevelopment of the 
Eastern areas. However, it has been suggested that possibly the deeper root of the 
problem is the level of democracy and the political exclusion that characterizes Turkey’s 
political life.105  Turkey has been almost constantly a case in which political exclusion 
was prominent in its political life. A significant change was a program started during 
Ozal’s era to improve the Kurd’s situation. Even this limited effort demonstrated that 
Ozal realized that chances for membership, which was very important for Turkey, could 
only occur by improving political performance as well as the status of minorities and 
human rights.106  
Nonetheless, the military remains very sensitive to the issue of Kurdish minority 
rights stating that the reforms required by the succession process encourage the PKK 
movement. The military and nationalist resistance to EU reforms has somehow resulted 
in the introduction of changes to the reform program signed by the Cabinet on March 19, 
2001 especially regarding aspects related to the Kurds and Cyprus.107 Thus, the Kurdish 
question poses an important impediment to the democratization of the country. However, 
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this stance has been a black hole for Turkey’s efforts and the country’s image in EU 
societies. Prominent civilians in Europe have strongly criticized Turkey for its stance 
towards the Kurdish issue.108 
Notwithstanding the security concerns and the implications for the domestic 
environment, Turkey has taken important steps in its alignment with European standards. 
The steps concern constitutional amendments and political reforms, which also affected 
the issue of human rights and minority rights as an extension of the status of Kurds. 
C. THE PATH TO PROGRESS 
1. Constitutional-Political Reforms 
The decision on the candidate status of Turkey in Helsinki in 1999 has pushed 
Turkey to introduce a series of fundamental reforms. Soon after the Helsinki decision, a 
significant debate started in Turkey concerning the conditions for accession to the EU. As 
a result, Turkey started a series of initiatives that would help its EU efforts. The 
initiatives also involved human rights and the declaration that the Supreme Board will 
facilitate the alignment with the European standard and would give high priority to issues 
relating to reforms for EU accession. This effort was further enhanced by the signing of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in August 2000, and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The above were an 
important step for the country and welcomed by the EU, which encouraged Turkey to 
make concrete progress as soon as possible.109 
In order to facilitate the implementation of reforms for EU accession, Turkey 
adopted its National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) on 19 March 
2001110. Using this as a political machine, important political reforms were announced 
that were incorporated in constitutional amendments. With the help of the NPAA, the 
country was able to introduce constitutional reforms created by the Parliament's 
Conciliation Committee and enjoyed a strong cross-party consensus. Thus, the country 
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succeeded in adopting a package of 34 amendments to the 1982 Constitution on 3 
October 2001. The package brought new provisions and alignment with the European 
Standards, mainly for Hunan Rights issues.111 Many of the amendments were related to 
the Copenhagen political criteria, the Accession Partnership and the NPAA. Additionally, 
an effort began in the same year to reform the judicial system. Nonetheless, the status of 
the judiciary and the relative powers of State Security courts and military courts 
continued to lag far behind the European standard highlighted mainly because of non 
compliance with the European Court of Human Rights. Problems also continued to exist 
at the political level since the Constitutional Court banned the Fazilet Party in Jun 
2001112 declaring impediments to freedom of expression and political will.  
In general, by 2001, limited improvement has occurred in practice. Nonetheless, 
Turkey’s political will to introduce a series of fundamental reforms that would bring the 
country closer to the European standard and as a result to membership, encouraged after 
the Helsinki decision, was further enhanced in the following years. As a result, the 
country passed a major constitutional reform in October 2001 aimed at improving the 
situation in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms and restricting the 
reasons for capital punishment.  The country also adopted a new Civil Code in November 
2001, and three sets of reform packages in February, March and August 2002.113 
The adoption of these reforms was important for two reasons. First, it declared the 
commitment of the majority of Turkey's political leaders to undertake all the efforts for 
the necessary reforms and their commitment to the EU project, and second, they occurred 
in a very difficult political and economic environment. Turkey faced a strong economic  
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crisis in 2001 and a more severe one in 2002. The governor party also called for early 
elections under the pressure of the worsening political instability. Thus, the reforms 
proved to be a major shift in the Turkish context. 
The reform package adopted by Parliament in August 2002 and just before the 
call for early elections was especially very important since it introduced changes in 
important issues mainly for the development of freedom and human rights.114  Among 
other changes were those made to Article 159 of the Turkish Penal Code stating that the 
expression of opinions against public institutions would no longer be a crime when not 
intentionally expressed to harm such institutions. Also, changes affecting Articles 312 of 
the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law, the Press Law, the Law on Political Parties and 
the Law on Associations actually improved the conditions of freedom in these areas. 
Moreover, a constitutional amendment was implemented to introduce changes to 
the composition and role of the National Security Council. However, as the 2002 Regular 
Report on Turkey’s progress states, these last reforms did not appear to have changed the 
manner in which the National Security Council operates in practice.  
Turkey continued its reform effort in 2003. Thus, Turkey ratified the Civil Law 
Convention on Corruption. As a result, on 1 January 2004, it became a member of the 
Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). Turkey also ratified 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on Social and Economic Rights 
as well as Protocol 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The country adopted 
four new major packages of political reform introducing changes to different areas of 
legislation. Some of the reforms were very important for political criteria since they 
concerned very sensitive Turkish, such as freedom of expression, freedom of 
demonstration, cultural rights and civilian control of the military. The seventh reform 
package adopted in July 2003 was very significant for such issues.  
 
 
                                                 
114 Ibid. See also “Turkish Legislature Makes History with Comprehensive Reforms” 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/08_03_02/dom.htm#d1, accessed 19 March 2004. 
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The 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress is important as it states that the 
new Parliament elected on 3 November 2002 supported these reform packages with 
overwhelming majorities declaring its support for better alignment with the values and 
standards of the European Union. 
The country also ratified the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with 
some reservations concerning its applications. Nonetheless, in April, the Constitutional 
Court canceled the Law Decree No. 285 of the Emergency Rule Administration Law, 
which prevented judicial recourse against decisions of the governor’s emergency rule 
enhancing the autonomy of the judiciary. Moreover, the Parliament adopted a law on 6 
August 2003 that made possible partial amnesty and a reduction in sentences for people 
involved in the activities of an illegal organization except for the leaders of the 
organization. According to estimates of September 2003, of 2,067 applications, 524 
prisoners were released and about 200 militants from illegal organizations surrendered by 
the end of 2002.115 
2. Human Rights 
Regarding human rights, Turkey also underwent significant steps. The 
constitutional amendments adopted by the Turkish Parliament on 3 October 2001 helped 
improve human rights and fundamental freedoms. What the amendments actually 
produced is limited opportunities for the suppression of basic freedoms such as the 
freedom of expression of thought, freedom of the press and freedom of association and 
gender equality.116 The Turkish Government also started to develop a framework for 
introducing further constitutional amendments with respect to freedom of expression and 
thought, as expected by the EU to facilitate progress towards satisfying the Accession 
Partnership priorities. 
The ban on the death penalty has been maintained. However, Article 38 of the 
Constitution limited the death penalty to cases of terrorist crimes as well as in times of 
war or the imminent threat of war. As stated in the 2001 Regular Report on Turkey’s  
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Brussels, 13 November 2001, Sec (2001) 1756 “2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s 
Progress towards Accession.” 
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progress, the reservation for terrorist crimes is not in line with Protocol 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as opposed to wartime crimes permitted under 
Protocol 6.  
Nonetheless, the reforms related to economic, social and cultural rights contained 
a number of positive elements. Turkey changed Articles 26 and 28, which prohibited the 
use of languages but further legislation and practices were needed in order for these 
reforms to be executed. Actually, as the 2001 report states, no improvement has occurred 
in the real enjoyment of cultural rights for all Turks, irrespective of their ethnic origin. 
Therefore, despite changes, the actual human rights conditions in Turkey need further 
improvement. 
To prepare for this improvement, a long public debate concerning EU accession 
took place in Turkey in 2002 with the participation of political parties. The debate 
focused on the accomplishment of the Copenhagen political criteria, particularly the 
abolition of the death penalty, Radio and TV broadcasting and the use of languages other 
than Turkish. Turkey also affirmed EU membership as the main objective of the country 
and of common value for almost all political parties.117 
This same year, Turkey showed progress in the area of freedom of association 
where the law on associations was modified and some restrictions lifted. Additionally, the 
new Civil Code included provisions aimed at improving gender equality and 
strengthening guarantees regarding the protection and rights of children. Turkey ratified 
the 1969 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
However, as stated by the 2002 report, trade unions remained subject to restrictions and 
child labor continued to exist.  Additionally, the legislation that allows for reduced 
sentences for crimes related to “honour killings” was still in effect. The August 2002 
package introduced changes in important issues such as the death penalty during 
peacetime and removed some restrictions on the law on broadcasting. However, the 
prosecution of writers, journalists and publishers still continues.  
                                                 
117 Data for the reforms in 2002 are derived from the Commission of the European Communities 
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Nonetheless, it allowed people to ask for a retrial when the European Court of 
Human Rights found their convictions to be in violation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Turkey once again was encouraged to pursue 
the reform process to strengthen democracy and the protection of human rights, in law 
and in practice overcoming the obstacles and satisfying the political criteria. 
In 2003, Turkey ratified the ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights). 
Turkey appears to have improved the situation regarding the fight against torture and the 
Turkish legal system has come closer to European standards in this respect. Additionally, 
reform of the prison system has continued and the rights of prisoners have been 
improved. In practice, however, the right to a lawyer is not always ensured, and there are 
still cases in which torture has been applied.118 Additionally, the possibility of retrial, 
introduced in 2002, has not been very effective, since in practice, few cases have been 
subject to retrial.  
The adoption of the reform packages has led to the lifting of several legal 
restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression. The changes to the Penal Code also 
have led to the release of many people imprisoned for non-violent expressions of opinion. 
However, some cases are still  pending against people for expressing non- violent 
opinions. As stated in the report of 2003, progress has been achieved in the area of 
freedom of demonstration and peaceful assembly where several restrictions have been 
lifted. Nevertheless, in some cases of peaceful demonstration, the authorities used force 
and associations still experience difficulties in their freedom of actions. Additionally, 
cases of prosecution against associations, and particularly human rights defenders 
continue, to occur. Moreover, when passing the UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Turkey issued a reservation to Article 27 that provides the right of minorities to 
enjoy their own culture, or religion, or to use their own language, which will be 
interpreted and applied in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Turkish 
Constitution and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.  As a result, the scope of freedom has 
been limited.  
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Regarding freedom of religion, the changes introduced by the reform packages 
have not yet produced the desired effects by 2003 as stated in the report on Turkey’s 
progress. Executive bodies continue to adopt a very restrictive interpretation of the 
relevant provisions. As a result, religious freedom remains lag far behind European 
standards. Additionally, measures taken to lift the ban on radio and TV broadcasting and 
education in languages other than Turkish have produced little practical effect.  
The above problems might lay in the reaction of the existing authorities’ 
infrastructure. As the Human Rights Overview 2004 for Turkey states “Public demands 
for change, a strengthening civil society, and European Union (EU) candidacy 
requirements are working together to force positive change in Turkey despite continuing 
determined resistance within the civil service, judiciary, and security forces.”119 
The report also states that the country introduced substantial reforms, but violence 
is still evident. Additionally, it assesses that the Kurds are not yet able to enjoy the 
freedoms of the reforms and although an effective program for returning them to their 
homes after the Turkish operations in the Southeast exists, many are still far from home.  
3. The Kurds 
Obviously, the Kurds are among the biggest problems for Turkey. Since 2000, 
one of the sore points for Turkey was that it has not yet signed the Council of Europe 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Turkey actually did not 
recognize minorities other than those defined by the Lausanne Treaty.  However, as the 
EU states, such minorities exist in Turkish society and they are clearly denied certain 
basic rights. Among them was the right to broadcast in their native language and receive 
instruction in their language, and the prerogative to express their views on such issues. 
Especially for the Kurds, the expression of pro-Kurdish views was not permitted 
by the Turkish State. As the report of 2000 states, three mayors from the Southeast  
                                                 
119 See Human Rights Overview 2004 for Turkey at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/12/31/turkey7023.htm, accessed 1 April 2004. 
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belonging to the pro-Kurdish HADEP Party were imprisoned while several newspapers 
and magazines have been forbidden and certain pro-Kurdish associations have been 
closed in the region under emergency rule.120 
By 2000, Turkey started a socio-economic development program in the region, 
aided by the disappearance of large scale armed fights in the Southeast and the reduction 
in conflicts between PKK armed militants and security forces. Turkey in November 1999 
lifted the state of emergency in the province of Siirt and in June 2000 in the province of 
Van. However, the state of emergency remained in effect in four provinces, along with 
the village guard system. The authorities have also been willing to allow a partial return 
of the population to their homes. 
During the next year, Turkey took many steps towards alignment with the 
European standards. However, as the 2001 regular report from the Commission on 
Turkey’s Progress states, there has been no improvement in the ability of members of 
ethnical groups with a cultural identity and common traditions to express their linguistic 
and cultural identity.  The issue of respect for cultural rights was particularly important 
for improving the situation in the Southeast. However, some cities banned organized 
celebrations for the Kurdish New Year. 
Turkey extended the state of emergency in the Southeast on 27 October 2000, on 
27 March 2001 and on 29 June 2001, for periods of four months for the four provinces of 
Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Sirnak and Tunceli. Reportedly, the security situation is much 
improved. The pro-Kurdish HADEP political party also frequently faced difficulties from 
the authorities, including police investigations.121 Turkish authorities forbade a HADEP 
demonstration to celebrate World Peace Day in Ankara, scheduled on 1 September 
2001.122 
                                                 
120 See 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, 8 
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Over the years, Turkey has invested in an economic aid and development program 
for areas most affected by years of violent conflict and terrorism. The National Security 
Council proposed an East and Southeast Action Plan for those displaced by the 
operations in the region to return to their homes. Under the auspices of this plan, it was 
estimated that up to 26,000 people as of July 2001, returned to their villages even though 
they faced problems from the village guards, who are armed and paid by the state to 
defend the evacuated or abandoned villages. Estimates bring the number of village guards 
to between 45,000 and 90,000 in the region. 
Following the decrease in tensions, the National Security Council recommended 
and the Parliament decided to lift the state of emergency in the provinces of Hakkari and 
Tunceli on 30 July 2002.123 The lifting of the state of emergency in the two provinces of 
the Southeast led to an improvement in the conditions of daily life. The security situation 
continued to improve in the Southeast and some relaxation in daily life has been reported. 
As a result, the Tunceli Culture and Nature Festival took place between 1 and 4 August 
with no ban on bands singing in Kurdish, while some previously banned journals and 
newspapers appeared again.124 
Efforts have continued to improve the situation of displaced persons. Further 
implementation of the “Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project” has occurred, and 
according to authorities, 37,000 persons returned to their villages by 2002.   
However, the majority continued to live in very difficult economic and social 
conditions.  The village guards system, and restrictions by the government applied as 
measures against terrorism, acted as a disincentive for displaced persons to return to their 
villages. 
 
                                                 
123 Actually implemented in August 2002 see, 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/08_03_02/dom.htm#d1, accessed 17 March 2004. 
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In August 2002, the government passed a very important reform package, which 
allowed the use of Kurdish.125 However some groups in Turkey perceived these reforms 
as “concessions undermining Turkey’s unity and independence.”126 As a result of the 
above package, some students across the country requested optional language classes in 
Kurdish be taught in universities. While some universities accepted several requests, they 
could not be submitted in others. Thus, problems for the implementation of such requests 
existed. Additionally, the state of emergency was extended for four months in the two 
other provinces of Diyarbakir and Şirnak, but the National Security Council indicated 
that it would be lifted in full by the end of the year. Also important to the treatment of the 
Kurds is that the Constitutional Court continued its judicial proceedings against the 
HADEP party based on the accusation that it was linked to a terrorist organization. 
In its report in 2002, the EU urged Turkey to begin a dialogue with the OSCE 
High Commissioner on National Minorities in January 2003. The OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities was, for the first time, permitted to visit Turkey 
with the goal of starting a dialogue on the situation of national minorities. However, no 
such dialogue has ensued from this initial meeting.127 
The state of emergency in the two remaining provinces of Diyarbakır and Şırnak 
was lifted on 30 November 2002 putting an end to almost 15 years of emergency rule in 
the East and Southeast of Turkey; considered to positively affect the region. It has led to 
a relative improvement in the general conditions in the area, although considerable 
difficulties remained. In May 2002, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General for Displaced Persons noted that an opportunity exists for the international 
community to work with the Turkish government on the problems related to displaced 
persons and insisted on a more comprehensive approach on the issue. The Turkish 
government, considering these proposals, took initiatives that will involve international 
partners and NGOs. 
                                                 
125 Broadcasts in Kurdish was allowed later. See “Regulations Legalizing Kurdish Broadcasts on State 
TV Adopted,” http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/12_19_02/dom.htm#d4, accessed 25 March 
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Implementation of the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project has continued, 
even though at a slow pace, and according to official sources, lead to the restoration of 
82,000 people between January 2000 and January 2003.  However, authorizations to 
return home are still difficult to obtain by displaced persons.  
Additionally, as the 2003 report states, the status of minorities is not in alignment 
with EU standards. Minorities have been subject to certain discriminatory practices by 
the authorities. There have been complaints that state-issued school history books are 
responsible for cultivating hostility towards minority groups. Moreover, parents 
belonging to different religious minorities have encountered difficulties in enrolling their 
children in religious minority schools.  
Finally, even if the law on political parties has been amended to make it more 
difficult to close down parties, problems continue to exist. The Constitutional Court has 
already banned HADEP128 and the same threat applies to DEHAP. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court ruled that DEHAP was responsible for submitting fake documents in 
order to participate in the November 2002 elections.129 
The 2003 report also states that the electoral system creates impediments for 
minority representation in Parliament. In the elections of November 2002, for example, 
the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP) did not reach the 10% threshold, despite 
receiving over 45% of the votes in five of Turkey’s 81 provinces. As a result, it remained 
outside of Parliament. 
4. The Path Ahead 
From the exploration of Turkey’s reforms since the Helsinki summit, some 
important topics come to light. In reality, Turkey’s alignment has progressed in most 
areas. However, it is also true that it still remains at an early stage of development for 
many issues, and Turkey must increase its efforts to implement its National Programme 
for the Adoption of the Acquis, in line with the Accession Partnership priorities for all 
issues.  
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During the Copenhagen Summit of December 13, 2002, the EU refused to set a 
date to start the accession process with Turkey.130  Instead, they decided that December 
2004 would be the review date for setting a date to start full membership negotiations.131  
The Turkish government’s main objective is to meet the Copenhagen political 
criteria in time to allow a positive assessment by the Commission by 2004, and thereby, 
pave the way for a decision by the European Council in December 2004 to start accession 
negotiations with Turkey. However, this possibility remains unlikely. Everyone is aware 
that the success of Turkey’s application is tied very closely to its performance in civil and 
political rights as well as human rights. Therefore, if important steps on these issues are 
not taken and human rights not effectively promoted, Turkey’s hope for immediate 
membership will be fruitless.  
Since human rights and minority rights are one of the most important steps for 
Turkey’s accession, the country has begun to implement reforms according to the acquis. 
However, an important impediment and a source of controversy is that minority rights 
concerns the Kurds. Turkey believes that the EU fails to understand the difference 
between the equal rights of citizens in the country and the separatist activities of the 
PKK. Thus, Turks feel that EU reforms cultivate the goals of the PKK. The EU, on the 
other hand, believes that a solution to the problem could result from recognition of 
Kurdish cultural identity and tolerance of that identity if they do not once again resort to 
separatist or terrorist activities.  
Turkey continues to accept only the minorities described in the 1923 Lausanne 
Treaty and considers the rest equal under the law. The Kurds are not included as 
minorities in that treaty, and therefore, every Kurdish movement is considered a 
separatist movement. Furthermore, it believes that the free use of other languages such as 
Kurdish could threaten Turkey’s national security. Also, Turkey is very sensitive about 
security issues.  
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The problems concerning the aforementioned concepts are possibly derived from 
the democratic institutions and the peculiarities of Turkey. The Kurdish issue is 
extremely important to those who uphold and measure security in Turkey.132 This creates 
difficulties for adopting acts and making decisions according to EU standards. On the 
other hand, and unfortunately for Turkey, no other choice exists. It must either comply 
with the EU directives on minority and human rights or say no to the European Union. 
Consequently, Turkey has gone to great lengths to ignore the EU project completely. 
Thus, a solution will not be simple. The implementation of the reforms shows that 
Kurdish rights are still not commensurate with EU standards and Turkey has problems in 
granting them full rights. The capture of Ocalan, the leader of PKK, was significant. 
Since then, the armed conflicts have decreased since the PKK removed its fighter wing 
from Turkey. However, the problems with the political criteria continue to exist and seem 
to be interrelated. The situation of human rights cannot but affect minority rights, which 
has resulted in also characterizing the meaning of democracy. In Turkey, however, it is 
possible to describe all problems as resulting from the level of democracy.  
The level of democracy derives from civil military relations. The military seems 
to make the important decisions concerning the policy orientation of the country. 
Although a significant alignment with the European standards exists, the military 
continues to be prominent. At least in issues related to foreign policy and security 
aspects, the military continues to be a decisive factor.133 More importantly, the military 
determines the threat as well as quantifying it. Since the military believes that Kurds are 
an important issue and any concession could threaten the integrity of the country, any 
decisions made concerning such issues will not be considered high priority. As can be 
seen, Turkey took important steps towards the implementations of measures or 
constitutional amendments on such issues. However, the results are not as satisfying as 
the reports on Turkish progress state in many cases. Moreover, important steps have not 
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been taken on many amendments, and Turkey still has some reservations since it believes 
they are special cases of security issues. However, these arguments are not acceptable to 
the EU, which demands complete alignment.  
Thus, the security concept creates impediments to democracy and freedom, and as 
result, for EU membership. The political elite seem to understand this issue, which started 
to imply that the military stance and its security concerns could threaten the 
Europeanization project of the country.134 
Thus far, it appears that strong reforms are being taken into consideration for 
security issues, and need special approval. For example, as concerns the August 2002 
program, the military was a decisive factor and gave the green light on the ‘condition’ 
that integration with Europe will not contradict the military’s traditional involvement in 
law order, internal enemies and foreign policy.135 
However, the provision of ‘conditions’ and partial measures will not be a viable 
solution, and also will not have the expected results.  When reviewing the reports on 
Turkey’s progress, note that the number of pages in the reports is increasing. The report 
of 2000 spends 22 pages out of a total 82 in examining the political criteria while the 
2001 spends 34 pages out of a total of 123 on the same topic. The 2002 Regular Report 
on Turkey’s progress towards accession spends 44 pages out of a total of 159, and finally, 
the 2003 report spends 45 pages out of a total of 148 pages. This increase in the number 
of pages commenting on the measures taken does disregard the fact that Turkey has made 
much  progress. For example, the comment that the electoral system creates impediments 
for the representation of the minorities appeared for first time in the 2003 report for 
progress on page 38, although it has been applied in Turkey since the 1980 coup. 
Therefore, remember that the entire process will not be a simple one. Europe will 
intentionally check whatever reforms that must be taken, and as reforms improve, 
verification will be more deliberate.   
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The above statements imply that whatever reforms taken must be strong and 
effective, and not just decisions made on paper. The political elite seems to be conscious 
of what the country must do. Thus, such voices exist, such as that of the former Foreign 
Minister Ismael Gem who stated that the “road to the EU goes through Diyarbakir.136 
However, although the political elite appears to have the will, it still does not have 
the power to make such important decisions. Therefore, what Turkey might need is more 
time until the political situation will be in alignment with the European standard and the 
political elite will hold total power as happens with western democracies.  
Nonetheless, Turkey’s path to date is important for another reason. From the 
exploration of Turkey’s path to progress since the Helsinki summit, it can be seen that 
Turkey has undertaken many measures. Turkey has ratified five conventions with respect 
to human and civil rights, and human rights have improved. Turkey also has made 
important decisions regarding the Kurds. It is important to keep in mind that all this great 
transformation happened because of Turkey’s desire to enter the EU. Thus, notice how a 
strong institution can lead to improvements in conditions in countries. This effort 
happened without violence resulting from the willingness to react. Turkey alone decided 
to implement the reforms. Its desire was to be included in a strong institution. The 
institution, on the other hand, simply established the criteria. Therefore, Turkey’s case 
highlights the importance of improving conditions without violence, and the importance 
of a strong and well-designed institution that could provide incentives for a better world. 
As such, Turkey’s accession could be more important and become a paradigm for the 
improvement of society by only providing the correct incentives via the right institutions.  
D. CONCLUSION  
Overall, in the past four years since the Helsinki summit, Turkey has made 
impressive legislative efforts, which constitute significant progress towards achieving 
compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria. However, the level of success in 
human rights and democracy, and mainly in minority rights, still lags behind the 
European Union’s standards. As stated by Rachel Denber 
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The reform process is certainly moving forward. But Turkish citizens will 
not experience real reform until they are free to assemble without fear of 
being beaten, tear-gassed and arrested.137 
There are significant problems in Turkey with respect to human rights, minority 
rights, and the level of democracy. Democracy and human rights are among the 
prerequisites for EU succession. Turkey has shown a significant improvement during the 
past few years. However, it appears that the source of the problem lies in Turkey’s 
democracy. The challenges to Turkey derive from the necessity to solve the Kurdish 
problem and to bring the level of human rights commensurate to European standards.  
Certainly, Turkey must make strong decisions regarding the status of Kurds and it 
is unlikely that such decisions will be made earlier than the end of 2004. Also, it is 
unlikely for such decisions to be rendered until Turkey feels assured that these provisions 
will not increase security issues or until the security level assessments have been decided 
within a calmer political environment characterized by a significant decrease in 
nationalistic instincts. Such a situation will be difficult to cultivate in a short period of 
time, and will be conducted based on further alignment of civil military relations with the 
European standard. Also needed is long-term social maturity, which can result from 
‘training’ the people according to European standards. Until then and before any attempt 
at making strong decision occurs, the state elite could raise strong objections. This 
reaction could, to an extent, cultivate and increase the nationalistic instincts of the 
country with strong repercussions for its orientation. Hence, it is unlikely that strong 
decisions will be made. Therefore, the decision on Turkey’s accession concerning these 
issues will be difficult in 2004 at least regarding those prominent issues such as in the 
case of the Kurds.  
The implementation of the reforms can be helped if the EU decides that the path 
of progress thus far is adequate to guarantee the country’s orientation and starts the 
process for setting the date for the beginning of the accession negotiations. Such a move 
could also strengthen the image of the political elite, which could take stronger measures. 
Such a case, however, implies Turkey’s success at the diplomatic level in order to 
                                                 
137 Comment by Rachel Denber Acting Executive Director Europe and Central Asia Human Rights 
Watch. See http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/12/31/turkey7023.htm, accessed on 1 April 2004. 
73 
convince and achieve the consent of the European powers. The success of such an 
outcome will likely result from the strong support of the United States. Do not forget that 
the decisive factor in the Helsinki decision concerning Turkey resulted from U.S. 
support.    
Despite the final outcome, Turkey has made progress and it is closer than ever to 
its goal. Its strong commitment thus far and its efforts with the NPAA show that its final 
success will only be a matter of time. Its success is also very significant since it could 
provide the paradigm on how to improve societies via strong institutions by only 
providing the right incentives. 
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V. GREECE AND CYPRUS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In June 1993, the Copenhagen European Council concluded that every country 
desiring to become a member will be able to do so upon satisfying certain economic and 
political criteria. The union moved towards the last enlargement taking in account the 
Copenhagen criteria. Cyprus was among the new candidate countries. 
In 1997, at the Luxemburg summit, The European Council decided to convene 
bilateral intergovernmental conferences in the Spring of 1998 to begin negotiations with 
Cyprus.138 Additionally, the accession of Cyprus was considered a useful fact that could 
help find a political solution to the Cyprus problem. The effort had to be made under the 
aegis of United Nations with the purpose of creating a “bi-community, bi- zonal 
federation.”139 Thus, it encourages the participation of representatives from the Turkish 
Cypriot community. The council also rejected Turkey’s candidacy and asserted that 
Turkey must undergo political and economic reforms in order to have a better chance at 
EU accession. 
However, after a period of deterioration in the relationship between Turkey and 
the EU, the Helsinki summit finally accepted Turkey as a candidate member.140 The 
summit decided that Turkey could enter according to the criteria applied to the other 
countries. Turkey now has to pursue political reforms, which include the alignment of 
human rights standards with those of the EU, respect for minorities, and the stabilization 
of its relationship with Greece. Specifically, Turkey must make every effort to resolve 
any outstanding border disputes and other related issues, differences or territorial disputes 
using the legal process. If two countries cannot agree on a solution, t the International 
Court of Justice must hear these differences.141 
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Press:0 Nr: SN400/97. 
139 Ibid., par 28. 
140 See Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, par 12. 
141 Ibid., par 4. 
75 
Also, a time limit exists for the implementation of a settlement. According to the 
decision, the European Council will review the disputes of candidate members keeping in 
mind how they affects the accession process, and in order to promote their settlement 
through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. 
Additionally, Turkey had to support a political settlement in Cyprus under the 
leadership of the UN and according to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. 
Thus, its differences with Greece and the resolution of the Cyprus issue link 
Turkey’s European ambitions. 
The current chapter explores Greek Turkish relations and the implications to the 
prospects of European membership for Turkey. The Cyprus issue has been an 
impediment to relationships between Turkey and Greece. The chapter also explores the 
implications of Cyprus. Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974, and Greek Turkish relations 
have deteriorated ever since. Cyprus recently became a member of the European Union. 
Although its accession happened without a resolution to the Cyprus problem, Turkey 
appeared to support this resolution and also supported the proposed plan by Kofe Anan. 
However, Cyprus is now a member and is able to on the EU’s policy.  
The chapter explores the historic relations between the two countries and their 
transformation in recent years resulting from Greek efforts. The chapter tries to assess the 
implications of this relation to Turkey’s efforts, especially after the recent rejection of 
Anan Plan by Greek Cypriots and the accession of Cyprus. 
B. DISPUTE WITH GREECE 
Turkey’s dispute with Greece has been a possible source of conflict since the 
1950’s. Their differences are caused by national identity issues. The creation of Greece 
resulted from fighting against the Ottoman Empire after years of occupation. Greece’s 
expansion occurred after liberating territories from the Ottoman Empire. Thus, for 
Turkey, Greece’s independence meant a loss of territories, while for Greece, 
independence meant a continuous struggle against Turkey.  
Greek independence started with the 1821 revolution, and since then, the country 
has continued to expand. The creation of modern Turkey is also related to the struggle 
against the Greek campaign in Asia Minor, which ended with their defeat by Kemal 
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Ataturk, resulted in an exchange of populations in 1923 – 1924.142  Eight years after this 
confrontation, Kemal Attaturk and the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos 
signed the Ankara Agreement, thus resolving many of their differences. 
During the first years of the Cold War, the two countries seemed to put aside their 
differences because their main priority became the threat of the Soviet Union. However, 
their relationship has deteriorated and posed a threat as an armed conflict on many 
occasions due to the differences over Cyprus.  
Until now, the differences between the two countries remained unresolved and 
continue to be a source of tension. Prominent among them is the status of the Aegean 
Sea. 
C. AEGEAN DISPUTE 
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention determined the status and legal 
determination of territorial waters. According to the law, every country has the right to 
extend its territorial water to 12 miles. Greece signed the law and maintains the 
prerogative of declaring its territorial waters at this distance even though it has not yet 
done so. Turkey, on the other hand, has not signed the law, and thus, does not recognize 
the law and prerogatives of Greece. Turkey’s concerns are that the increase of territorial 
waters from Greece to the above distance could make access to its major ports in the 
Aegean Sea more difficult since Greece has many islands near the Turkish western coast.  
As a result, Turkey threatens that any effort by Greece to increase its territorial water 
constitutes a casus belli. Greece, on the other hand, stresses the importance of these 
issues and raises the subject of Turkey’s violation of international law143 and considers 
any effort at negotiation to be impossible as long as Turkey continues144 with its threat. 
                                                 
142 For a description of Asia Minor’s campaign, see David Fromkin “A Peace to End All Peace. The 
Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East,” pp. 530-558.  
143 As Greece asserts “the islands (including the islands of the Aegean Sea) are clearly entitled to 
continental shelf rights, according to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (Art. 1) and the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Art. 121).” Greece stresses also that although Turkey has not 
ratified the above Conventions the “… ICJ has explicitly accepted (1969, case of the North Sea Continental 
Shelf) that Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf should be regarded as 
crystallizing rules of Customary International Law, thus accepting that the islands have a continental shelf 
on the same footing as land territory.”  See 
http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/aegean_continental_shelf.html, 
accessed April 15 2004. 
144  For Turkey’s position, see http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/ade/adeb/, accessed 15 April 2004. 
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The determination about the territorial waters also created additional disputes 
between the two countries. Greece retained Aegean airspace for 10 nautical miles from 
the coasts. Turkey rejects Greece’s airspace and believes that Greek airspace must be 
equal to the territorial waters and not more than six miles. This assertion is not only a 
matter of a simple dispute since Turkey sent its aircraft within six miles of Greece, which 
responded with the interception of the aircraft that violated its airspace. The violations of 
Greece’s airspace have continued since 1974. After 2002, the violations increased and 
Turkey’s aircraft were flying with armed weapons.145. Fights among the aircrafts are a 
potential source of a greater conflict between the two countries. On the other hand, 
Greece’s response to Turkish claims is that Greece can have territorial waters of twelve 
miles, and thus, an airspace extended the same distance as well. Therefore, it can have an 
airspace of 10 mile distance since its legal prerogative is up to twelve miles. Additionally, 
Greece emphasizes that the status quo has been established by treaties and conventions 
since the 1930’s. Finally, it states that Turkey began its challenges in the early 1970s’, 
almost simultaneously with the invasion of Cyprus. 
Along with the above dispute, Turkey wanted a bilateral discussion with Greece 
to resolve all undetermined issues and gray zones in the Aegean Sea. Greece, on the other 
hand, asserts that the only dispute concerns the continental shelf, and must be resolved by 
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice at Hague.  Turkey has continuously 
denied the resolution of the dispute via the International Court of Justice, preferring 
bilateral negotiations where it feels it would be more successful in asserting its 
positions.146 
D. MILITARIZATION OF THE ISLANDS  
Another important issue regarding bilateral relations is the militarization of the 
Eastern Aegean and Dodecanese islands. Turkey insists that Greece, with the 
militarization of the Islands, violates the Treaty of Paris in 1947. Greece, on the other 
hand, asserts that the militarization of the Islands of the Eastern Aegean falls into three 
                                                 
145 Costas Melakopides, “Turkish Political Culture and the Future of the Greco-Turkish 
Rapprochement,” p. 3. 
146 See http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/ade/adeb/, accessed 10 February 2004. 
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different categories.147 The first includes the islands of Limnos and Samothrake. The 
right of militarization of these two islands was established by the Treaty of Montreux of 
1936, and has been recognized by Turkey as Greece asserts. The second category 
includes the islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria. The Treaty of Lausanne 
determines their military status, which imposed partial demilitarization and not complete 
demilitarization of the islands. Thus, the presence of military forces was foreseen, and 
Greece maintains some forces there to protect its borders. The protection of the borders is 
also the reason for maintaining a number of National Guard units in the Dodecanese. In 
order to enhance its argument, Greece states that article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
foresees that every country has the right of legitimate defense of its territory. Greece also 
says that the application of the above article is justified in its case since Turkey created 
the 4th Army Group of the Aegean, which is located exactly opposite the Greek islands, 
and is equipped with the largest fleet of landing-craft in the Mediterranean.148  Greece 
also reiterated  Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus, and the consistent Turkish claims 
concerning the territorial integrity of the Greek islands as supporting elements for its 
argument. Finally, Greece uses Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, which states that the right 
of legitimate defense contained in Article 51 overrides any conventional obligation to the 
contrary.  
The status of the islands has been a controversial issue for relations between the 
countries. In 2000, for example, Greece withdrew from NATO exercises in the Aegean 
Sea when the plan refused to include Lemnos and Ikaria.  Although both countries have 
taken important steps towards their rapprochement, and have announced their 
commitment to the continuation of the improvement of relations, when it is then 
necessary to decide on such important issues, their commitment vanishes.  
                                                 
147 For in depth details of Greece’s position see: 
http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/turkeys_claims_greece_positions_ae
gean.html, accessed 12 March 2004. 
148 According to the former Greek Defense Minister Varvitsiotis, contrary to Turkish claims, the 
Turkish 4th Army is operational and its exercise activities are focused on joint landing operations. These 
exercises are directed against well selected Turkish beaches simulating the actual operational Greek islands 
beaches; see Ioannis M. Varvitsiotis, “The Turkish Threat,” in Security in Southeastern Europe and the 
U.S.-Greek Relationships, Robert Pfaltzgraff and Dimitris Keridis eds., (Mclean, Virginia: Brassey’s, Inc. 
1997), pp. 118-119. 
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However, the EU commitment demands that the two countries resolve their 
disputes. The EU will review the situation by the end of 2004. In case both countries have 
failed to resolve their issues, the EU will end their differences in the Hague court.  
E. CYPRUS ISSUE 
1. The Island Invasion 
The Cyprus issue is one of the biggest problems for relations between Greece and 
Turkey. Actually, a total settlement of Greek-Turkish differences cannot be achieved 
without a mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem. Cyprus was under British 
rule until the 1950’s. The Turkish government began to worry about the fate of the 
Turkish Cypriots when the British were thinking about abandoning control over the 
island. Turkish concerns came from the fear that Greek Cypriots would demand a union 
with Greece, and this could threaten the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, Turkey 
agreed to an independent state where both sides could have equal rights. The creation of 
an independent state prevented the union with Greece and Turkey, and Britain and 
Greece were also declared the guarantors of Cyprus independence under the 1960 Treaty 
of Guarantee.  
The treaty provided legal space for Turkish influence concerning political aspects 
on Cyprus, and gave it the right to intervene unilaterally or along with the other guarantor 
powers to prevent any violation of Cyprus’ legal agreements and constitution.  In 1964, 
President Makarios sought to amend the constitution. The amendments would entail that 
the Turkish community would become a minority instead of being equal with the Greek 
Cypriot community. Turkey considered this unacceptable.149   
The intension was to intervene in Cyprus, but the United States and its President 
Lyndon Johnson deterred this intervention.150 The U.S. president told the Turkish Prime 
Minister , Ismet Inonu, that in the case of intervention, the United States would not 
support Turkey with aid if the Soviet Union moved against Turkey in retaliation for the 
intervention. 
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150 See David W. Lesch, “The Middle East and the United States. A Historical and Political 
Reassessment,” p. 430. 
80 
Lyndon Johnson’s letter was leaked to the Turkish. Relations between Turkey and 
the United States deteriorated but it also created anti-American sentiments in Greece. 
Finally, Turkey’s intervention occurred ten years later in 1974. The cause was an attempt 
by the military junta in Greece to overthrow Makarios and install Samson as President.151  
The Turkish Prime Minister at that time, Boolent Ecevit, asked the British 
government to  intervene as a guarantor of the 1960 Treaty. When Britain refused, 
Turkey decided to invade Cyprus alone. The invasion led to the expatriation of 200,000 
Greek Cypriots and to the occupation of 38% of the island’s land. Since then, Turkey has 
maintained a military presence in the area consisting of 35,000 soldiers while the island 
has been divided in two areas. The invasion deteriorated the relations between Turkey 
and the United States, and the United States and Greece.152 
Nine years after the intervention in 1983, the Turkish Cypriots asserted their 
autonomy declaring an independent state with the TRNC and Rauf Denktas as its 
president. Turkey is currently the only country that recognizes the illegal state. The 
Turkish Cypriots rely upon subsidies from Turkey in order to survive since this side of 
Cyprus is economically isolated. Turkey, on the other hand, states that the Cyprus case is 
one of the significant security concerns and of great strategic importance. They thus 







                                                 
151 Andrew Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute” The International Institute of Strategic Studies Winter 
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Since the late 1990’s, Turkey appeared to make a stronger commitment to Turkish 
Cyprus and moved to create an economical and financial union with Turkey. It appears 
also to prefer a two state solution instead of the long supported bi-zonal and bi-communal 
federation.154 The situation remains unchanged, and it is a strong impediment to their 
relations.155 
However, the Luxemburg summit decided to begin negotiations with Cyprus for 
the states that would “contribute positively to the search for a political solution to the 
Cyprus problem through the talks under the aegis of the United Nations which must 
continue with a view to creating a bi-community, bi-zonal federation.”156 Thus, Turkey’s 
position for a two state position is in opposition to the EU directives for a solution to the 
Cyprus issue. Moreover, the Helsinki summit accepted Turkey’s candidacy. However, 
Turkey must now comply with the accession criteria. One, of course, was the settlement 
of the Cyprus issue. 
2. The Solution’s Efforts 
An effort was made to resolve this problem under the directives of the EU. Thus, 
the UN Security Council Resolution 1250 of 29 June 1999 invited the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot leaders to engage in direct negotiations. On 3 December 1999, a round of 
“proximity talks” began in order to prepare the groundwork for future direct negotiations 
on the Cyprus problem.  At its meeting on 10 and 11 December 1999 in Helsinki, the 
European Council welcomed the initiation of the talks and expressed its strong support 




                                                 
154 Ibid., p. 80. 
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The proximity talks continued without any substantive results. In 2000, the 
Turkish troops made a small advance at one point in the buffer zone where a village with 
four Greek Cypriot families is located, raising protests from both the Greeks and the UN 
Secretary-General.158 
In 2001, the Regular Report on Turkey’s progress stated that the Turkish 
representatives at the Association Council with Turkey in June 2001 expressed their 
support for the Secretary General’s efforts for a Cypriot political solution.  However, EU 
representatives indicated their disappointment that these expressions of support have not 
been followed by concrete actions to facilitate this solution.159 In particular, the 
disappointment derived from Turkey’s support for Mr. Denktash’s decision to withdraw 
from the proximity talks under UN auspices and to refuse the Secretary-General’s 
invitation to talks in New York in September 2001.  
The EU once again invited Turkey to support a solution without additional 
preconditions in order to facilitate the chance of achieving a settlement before the 
conclusion of the accession negotiations with Cyprus. The argument was that the above 
achievement could enable the Turkish Cypriots side to participate in the negotiations, and 
thus provide their perspectives.160  
Turkey, strongly encouraged by the EU, has continued to express support for 
direct talks between the leaders of the two sides in Cyprus. The United Nations Security 
Council also stated that the Greek and Turkish parts must conclude a common settlement 
before the end of accession negotiations. On 16 January 16 2002, the leader of the Greece 
Cypriots, Glafkos Klerides, and the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denktash, 
started talks with the purpose of achieving an agreement by the summer of 2002.161   
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The above effort failed and the presidency conclusion in Copenhagen, 12 and 13 
December 2002 actually set a new timetable, which welcomed the commitment of the 
Greece and Turkish Cypriots to reach a settlement by 28 February 2003 based on the 
UNSC’s proposals.162 
However, the presidency conclusions in Brussels on 20 and 21 March 2003 states 
that the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General to provide a settlement in Cyprus 
have failed.163 It appeared that the Turkish government has, on many occasions, 
supported the continuation of negotiation for an agreed solution.  Since the talks under 
UN auspices in The Hague failed, Turkey finally expressed the desire to reach a 
settlement before May 2004.164 
The European Council in Thessaloniki on 19-20 June 2003 urged both the Greek 
and Cypriot leadership to support the UN Secretary General's efforts strongly and called 
them to resume the talks based on his proposals.165 
However, on 8 August, Turkey signed a framework agreement aiming to establish 
a customs union with the northern part of Cyprus.166 Since this action was against 
international law, it could threaten Turkey’s membership prospects and also work against  
Turkey's commitments in its customs union with the EC. As a result, the Turkish 
government stated that the agreement would not be ratified.  
Efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem continued with the strong support of the 
EU, which seems confident of a viable solution. The last presidency conclusions in 
Brussels state that  
The European Council emphasizes its continuing strong support for the 
efforts of UN Secretary General Annan to help the parties seize this 
historic opportunity to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the 
Cyprus problem consistent with the relevant UN Security Council 
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Resolutions.  The European Council remains convinced that a just, viable 
and functional settlement is achievable by 1 May. It urges all parties to 
maintain a firm commitment to a successful outcome to the negotiating 
process with the collaboration of the governments of Greece and 
Turkey167. 
However, the result was not accordingly optimistic and finally was declared by 
public referendum in 24 April 2004. The European Council also expressed its desire for 
the accession of a united Cyprus. Additionally, it stated that the settlement would be 
according to the principles of the European Union.168 
At least on the part of the Greeks, during the effort to seek a resolution, it appears 
that Turkey continues to be wavering in its commitment to support the settlement of the 
Cyprus problem.  Thus, the former Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, sent a message 
to Turkey to stop supporting the Rauf Denktash’s intransigency. The Prime Minister also 
stated that EU accession could not be implemented unless the Cyprus issue has been 
resolved, and that Ankara controls the political situation in Northern Cyprus and 
determines the moves of the Turkish Cypriots.169 
After a round of negotiations in the United States, and finally in Switzerland, 
modifications to the Anan plan were disappointing. Actually, it proved impossible to 
have an agreement over the final modification of the Anan plan by both sides. Only 
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots said they would accept it, while Greece and the Greek 
Cypriots appeared to be in doubt. Thus, the decision was to submit the settlement plan for 
the island to popular referenda.170 
The official Greek stance appeared to lean towards support of the plan and urged 
the Greek Cypriots to accept it. However, Greece also stated that the Greek Cypriots 
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would undertake the final decision, and that regardless of the decision, Greece would 
render its support. Officially, Turkey seemed to take the same stance on supporting the 
Anan plan. Additionally, the Turks Cypriots appeared to support the plan strongly, 
although its leader, Rauf Denktas, was against the plan.  
The current Cyprus leadership was also against the plan, which called on the 
people to reject the plan.171 The result of the voting on 24 of April was according to the 
estimates, and the plan was rejected since the Greek Cypriots voted overwhelming 
against it.172 
Cyprus finally became part of the Union on 1 May 2004, without a resolution to 
the division of the island. Based on all the procedures, Turkey appears to have won since 
it had fully supported the plan, although, in the end, it was not accepted. Therefore, 
Turkey met one of the requirements to help resolve or seek a settlement to the Cyprus 
issue, although it appeared to act without clear direction from the beginning of the 
negotiations. Moreover, the Cyprus situation has remained as it was until now. The 
negative answer from the Greeks also resulted in a more cooperative stance towards the 
Turkish Cypriots by the EU.173 
F. GREECE STANCE 
The Greeks were successful because Cyprus was invited to join the EU even 
without a settlement. Thus, the Greek Cypriots appear not to have any real reason to 
make concessions. The plan was a result of what was considered to be a great 
compromise on 6 March 1995 in Brussels. The Greeks endorsed Turkey’s Customs  
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Union with the EU and withdrew its veto for a substantial financial protocol providing 
aid to Turkey, and in exchange, the EU made a commitment to set the date for 
negotiation with Cyprus.174  
Thus, the Cyprus problem became a EU problem and Greece tried to be 
successful by using political means to obtain what was lost in battle and unable to regain 
through bilateral negotiations. Greece was confident that the accession of Cyprus “..could 
provide the catalyst for a just and viable solution along the lines defined by the U.N. 
Security Council.”175 
Actually, Greece changed its approach towards Turkey in the late 1990’s from a 
radical and strong stance in the previous era to a smoother and cooperative approach. The 
policy was characterized by the utilization of international institutions and actions 
according to the principles of international law, international ethics and mutual support 
from like-minded international actors. Priority was given to strengthening the economy 
while foreign relations chose a diplomatic approach and a rational strategy of deterrence. 
Support for this substantive turn resulted from the successful Europeanization of the 
Cyprus issue as described by the 1995 compromise. Political elites of the country also felt 
the new stance to be very promising and rewarding, and thus, they lent their support to 
the consistent rapprochement efforts with Ankara.176 
1. The Greece- Turkey Rapprochement 
As a result of Greece’s new stance and the Turkish efforts for meeting the EU 
criteria, relations between Turkey and Greece have continued to improve. In 2001, by 
both Ankara and Athens adopted a number of confidence measures with the help of the 
Foreign Ministers of both countries.177 
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The two Foreign Ministers opened a direct telephone line and inform each other 
of their military exercises, thus, in essence, cultivating a cooperative approach. In June 
2001, they also decided on an additional set of measures for confidence building. These 
positive developments could enhance the possibility for a peaceful settlement of disputes 
between the two countries, in accordance with the Helsinki European Council 
conclusions and the Accession Partnership with Turkey as the EU estimated in its 2001 
report.178 
In April 2001, Greece also changed its military doctrine and ended the state of 
war mobilization with Turkey, which had been imposed since the 1974 invasion of 
Cyprus.  Athens also announced a plan to reduce its armed expenditures along with 
reducing its armed forces from 140,000 to 80,000-90,000 men.179 Turkey also responded 
to this gesture by postponing defense planning measures.180 Even if the primary reason 
for the above reduction was economical, the measure helped create a better climate 
between the two countries. 
These good relations also continued in 2002, mainly as a result of the efforts of 
the two Foreign Ministers. The new AKP government, which won the November 2002 
elections declared in July that it will continue this effort for better relations between the 
two countries. Thus, the two sides endorsed ten bilateral co-operation agreements on 
subjects related to the environment and economic development. Additionally, they signed 
five co-operation agreements for culture and emergency relief.  In 13 February 2002, a 
Turkish-Greek Joint Economic Commission met for the first time in Athens, and signed a 
protocol for cooperation in areas ranging from energy, industry, agriculture, transport, 
and customs.181 
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Moreover, the two countries agreed to the readmission of illegal migrants. This 
was a hotly debated issue mainly for Greece, which has received many immigrants during 
the past few years. The building of confidence measures has continued to provide 
agreements for the cancellation of military exercises in the Aegean Sea and contacts 
between the intelligence agencies of both countries. The two countries also started 
exploratory contacts in March about the Aegean Sea under the initiative of both Foreign 
Ministers. As a demonstration of the new era in the relations between the two countries, a 
joint ceremony for the 50th anniversary of NATO in Brussels was organized. A 
cornerstone for their Economic co-operation happened in March 2002, when they also 
agreed on a €300 million project to build a natural gas pipeline, providing natural gas 
from the Caspian Sea area to Greece.182 
Relations between Turkey and Greece continue to improve and the governments 
of both countries pledge to continue rapprochement. Progress has also be made on the 
signing of bilateral agreements between Greece and Turkey. The countries also continued 
the explanatory talks on the Aegean issue through several meetings with the Continental 
Shelf as the main topic.  On 26 May 2003, the two Foreign Ministers Gül and Papandreou 
agreed to an exchange between military academies and military hospitals. Additionally, 
they agreed to exchange personnel between the Partnership for Peace training centers of 
both countries in July.183 
Both countries also have mutually decided to cancel the autumn 2003 military 
exercises and signed the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines and the Olympic 
truce.184Additionally, in February 2003, taking measures towards further economic  
                                                 
182 See 29 March 2002, Turkish Daily News, Turkey and Greece Sign Gas Pipeline Protocol 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_29_02/for.htm#f8, accessed 28 February 2004. 
183 Data from the 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession. 
184 Signed by the Foreign Ministers Papandreou and Gul in Athens in October 21, 2003; see “The 
Turkish Foreign Minister Signed the Olympic Truce Declaration,” Macedonian Press Agency, October 21, 
2003 available online http://www.mpa.gr/article.html?doc_id=409934, accessed March 30, 2004.  Decision 
on mines were taken earlier.  See News, 16 March 2002, 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_16_02/for.htm#f6, accessed 10 March 2004 entitled: 
Turkey Decides to Accept to the Ottawa Convention on Land Mines. 
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cooperation, both countries signed an agreement for the supply of natural gas from 
Turkey to Greece and an agreement on double taxation with important economic 
expectations.185 
In this vein, Greece’s former Foreign Minister recently sent a proposal to his 
counterpart in Turkey for a gradual matching reduction in defense spending of the two 
countries. Although the Turkish Foreign Minister did not commit to signing a proposed 
agreement, he founded it very positive.186 
The change in strategy towards Turkey is believed by the country to be producing 
results. Peaceful relations with Turkey, the accession of Cyprus to the EU and the 
solution of the political problems “has steadily characterized and strengthened the role 
and credibility of the country on the European Union and the international stage.”187  
It appears that Athens relates the accession of Turkey to a peaceful settlement of 
their differences. As such, Athens seems to utterly support Turkey’s EU aspirations. This 
support was publicly declared in Greece. Nonetheless, some voices are speaking out 
against the prospect of Turkish membership, such as Athens Archbishop Christodoulos, 
head of the Orthodox Church of Greece in his negative expression of Turkey’s ambitions 
to join the European Union.188 However, even in such cases, the government restored the 
situation and declared support for Turkey’s efforts.189 
                                                 
185 See http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/bilateral.html, accessed 
15 March 2004. 
186 ANA 20 January 2004 22:05:44, “Gul Reiterates Papandreou’s Defense Spending Reduction P-
proposal is Positive.” 
187 Former Greek Foreign Minister G. A. Papandreou in the January edition of “KRAMA” magazine 
entitled “The Greek Advantage in he Balkans- Our Ankara Policy.” 
188 Although the statement was out of his jurisdiction, Athens Archbishop Christodoulos enjoys great 
support from the people in Greece. 
189 See ANA (Athens News Agency) 06 December, 2003, Gov't on Turkey's EU Prospects after 
Archbishop's Tirade Replying to the Archbishop.” Former Government spokesman Christos Protopapas 
stressed that the exercise of foreign policy was the exclusive prerogative of the government, which 
considered that supporting Turkey's European prospects would be beneficial to Greece.”  
Former Foreign Minister George Papandreou also stressed that “the European Union was the “answer” 
to the continent's history of conflict and bloodshed, which came to open new and peaceful roads”. He used 
the example of the French and Germans, who can cooperate today although they were enemies in the past. 
 He also added that “The more people can become members of the European family because they adopt 
these principles, the better it is for us. Greece has painfully experienced the mistakes of the past. Let us 
move forward by learning from them, not repeating them”.  
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Thus, the governmental position fully supports Turkey’s ambitions for the EU, 
and more importantly, this position remained stable throughout the political spectrum. 
The new government in Greece after the March 2004 elections is also supportive of 
Turkey’s European aspirations.190 
The argument next might concern the processes of integration. A Turkey in line 
with European standards will concentrate more on domestic and economic issues. This is 
a rather Kantian approach191 to the Greek stance that possibly believes that such a Turkey 
will have a democratic governorship and threats from political ambitions of other elites, 
including the military based on the cultivation of ethnicism ideas and the promotion of 
hatred, will cease to exist. Thus, Greece appears close to the Turkish effort for the 
European project, and both main political parties express this opinion, as is apparent after 
the recent elections.  
2. The Path Ahead 
From the above analysis, it seems that Turkey’s Greek relations have improved. 
Turkey has taken strong steps towards integration. However, even if the situation appears 
to be a friendly, it is not possible to absolutely state that this situation can continue 
forever. Two sets of evidence bring this to light. 
 
                                                 
190 See ANA (Athens News Agency) “Greece Desires Turkey's European Prospect, Spokesman says” 
29 April 2004. “The Greek Government Desires Turkey's European Prospect, government spokesman 
Theodoros Roussopoulos said Wednesday, responding to questions during a regular press briefing on 
Athens' stance regarding the neighboring country's future vis-à-vis the EU.” Can be found also at 
http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=591&article=13401, 
accessed 5 May 2004. 
See also ANA (Athens News Agency) Greek FM: Athens Continues to Back Turkey’s EU Prospects, 
06 May, 2004 Greek Foreign Minister Petros Molyviatis “ reiterated Athens’ decision to maintain its 
support for neighboring Turkey’s European orientation” and “[he]… said it would be a mistake for Athens 
to try and block Turkey’s European prospects” Can be found also at 
http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=223&article=13439, 
accessed 7 May 2004. 
See also http://www.turkishdailynews.com/FrTDN/latest/for.htm#f4, Greece’s Prime Minister K. 
Karamanlis said “I confirm the support of the Greek government and me personally as to Turkey's course 
towards Europe and Mr. Erdogan's reform program,” accessed 10 May 2004. 
191 Kant believed that Government  people do not cause wars. Democracy is the highest expression of 
the will of the people. Therefore, democracies are considered more pacific than the other political systems. 
Thus, the expansion of democracies could lead to the elimination of war. See I. Kant “On Eternal Peace”. 
Might the Greek approach relate to the restoration of democracy to Turkey with the elimination of the 
disputes? 
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First, no real concessions occurred between the two countries. Although their 
relation seems to be good, they seem to cooperate on many aspects in their policies, and 
such cooperation falls short of the great expectations. Whatever has been currently done 
is of small importance, and is concerned with issues that do not consider controversial. 
The reduction of arm defense, for example, is small in scale, also results from economic 
reasons,192 and is not something that will really set the basis for a new cooperative stance 
between the two countries. Important issues which are highly controversial, such as the 
Aegean Sea, continue until now to not be part of the agenda. On reason may be that lack 
of a common point on these issues. Moreover, since no progress has been made on the 
above aspects until recently, and because a time limit for the countries to resolve their 
differences exists, which is the end of the 2004, it is unlikely that a solution will be 
reached by then. It is very difficult to make the strong decisions needed at this time since 
they could prove to be politically damaging to the leaders.193 The situation might be 
better in Greece where the political elites hold real power as opposed to Turkey, where 
security concerns continue the military’s political power and nationalist instincts.194 
Therefore, the resolution of the dispute of the Aegean Sea will be unlikely in 2004. 
Whether Turkey’s possibility for membership will consequently be affected by this 
outcome remains to be seen. 
Since the agreement between the two seems impossible until the end of 2004, the 
issue will likely be resolved via the jurisdiction by the Hague Court. In this case, both 
countries have to accept the solution regardless of its outcome. However, as seen with the 
resolution of the dispute via the Hague Court, Greece’s position from the beginning of 
                                                 
192 Turkey faced a serious economic crisis in 2001 and a more severe one in 2002. Greece, on the 
other hand, had to comply with the economic implications of the Monetary Union. 
193 See Paul B. Henze “Turkey: Towards the Twenty-First Century, A Rand Note. The author says 
that every concession in Cyprus could harm the politician and thus “It is unwise for any Turkish or Greek 
politician to accede to or advocate permanent settlement on Cyprus that domestic rivals can use against 
him” p. 14. The same notion could easily apply to the Aegean issue since it is a long-standing dispute 
between the two countries and of equal, or greater, importance.  
194 In his TESTIMONY (RAND) written in June 2001, Ian O. Lesser assessed that “The more 
significant force on the Turkey scene today is arguably the Turkish nationalism- and the behaviour of 
Turkey’s nationalist party (MHP) is one of the large open questions for future.”  The MHP remained 
outside of the parliament during the last elections (November 3 2002) but is an important force in Turkey 
and opposed to any concession on Cyprus and the Aegean issue. The most important, however, in Turkey’s 
circumstances is the stance of the military towards its security concerns.   See Ian O. Lesser, “Turkey, 
Greece, and the U.S. in a Changing Strategic Environment: Testimony Before the House International 
Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe,” p. 3. 
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the dispute was known, while Turkey preferred the bilateral agreements. Therefore, it 
seems that Greece expects to gain more from using international law when it feels that 
Turkey will have to retract its illegal assertions. If this is the case, then Turkey has to 
accept another compromise in its long-standing position. The point is that such a 
compromise has to do with its vital, or in some cases, security interests.  
This could be a strong test for Turkey, and the result will be likely to be a product 
of a combination of other factors. These will concern  who decides what is in the best 
interests of the country, and as an extension, what security means and how it is threatened 
by the important decisions that Turkey must make.195 Additionally, what is the level of 
nationalism, how and if is this was cultivated and by whom, and how could this become a 
strong internal factor that could led to the rejection of whatever compromise.  
Thus, Turkey’s stance on the resolution of the dispute will not be an easy task. 
Nonetheless, it is not possible to know for which side the final decision of the Court will 
lean. Cyprus, for example, was expected to create concerns in Turkey but, in the end, it 
was the Greeks who rejected the plan.  
A second important reason is that whatever approach that has been undertaken 
between the two, has mainly be done on the part of Greece.196  The argument goes that 
Turkey must show a reciprocal stance and move towards some concessions. Failing to do 
so might create impediments to Greek politicians to move forward, and might give rise to 
the exploitation of nationalist instincts since Greece appears to be the weak link and the 
part that it provides without reciprocation. Turkey has not yet extended such a gesture.197 
Additionally, no agreement has been reached about the hotly debated topics of the 
                                                 
195 See also Chapter III. 
196 Opinion supported by F. Stephen Larrabeeand and Ian O. Lesser, “Turkish Foreign Policy in an 
Age of Uncertainty,” p. 87. 
197 This note added later. During his visit to Greece and Turkey in May 2004, the Prime Minister 
promised that Turkey would reopen the theological seminary on the island of Halki. Although this is not 
the subject that will decrease the differences between the countries, it is an important and shows that the 
two countries are closer than ever to a cooperative and mutual resolution. It is also important since it is the 
first gesture of Turkey since the changed stance of Greece.  See Last update 09 May 2004 18:30 
http://www.in.gr/news/article.asp?lngEntityID=536428&lngDtrID=244, accessed 9 May 2004. 
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Aegean Sea as declared recently by the former Greek Foreign Minister.198 Moreover the 
accession of Cyprus happened without a resolution to the Cyprus issue. Cyprus might 
have not realized the aspirations of a unite Cyprus but now has a ‘voice’ (vote) to the 
European foreign policy. 
Nonetheless, Greece seems to continue its friendly stance, and  Athens appears to 
associate the accession of Turkey to a peaceful settlement of their differences. Not only 
does Athens seems to support Turkey’s European project, but it seems that it will support 
Turkey in setting the date of the negotiations as stated by the deputy Foreign Minister in 
Greece.199  As such, Athens will not be an impediment to Turkey’s EU aspirations.  
Therefore, Greece might appear close to Turkey’s effort for the European project, and 
both main political parties agree upon this opinion, as evident after the recent elections. 
Turkey, on the other hand, feels confident that the EU will set the date for starting 
accession negotiations this December. Turkey is also threatening that if the EU acts 
differently, then Turkey will have to choose a different orientation and has the option to 
do so.200  
G. FINAL CONCLUSION 
Overall, Turkey has made a great deal of progress.  Turkey has made many efforts 
towards EU membership, and it is unlikely that such efforts will halt since they would 
signal the failure of the Europeanization project. Inside this framework, Turkey’s Greece 
rapprochement will likely continue. An important test for integration is the Cyprus issue, 
which seems to have turned out the best for Turkey. Greece, on the other hand, shows a 
cooperative approach and efforts to resolve the problem via diplomatic channels. Greece 
                                                 
198 See ANA (Athens News Agency) 17 December 2003 entitled: FM Papandreou: No Results Yet 
from Greek-Turkish Talks. Foreign Minister George Papandreou said that there are no results yet from 
Greek-Turkish talks. Additionally he said that”…[the]… Greek side would consider the referral of Aegean 
continental shelf dispute to the International Court at The Hague as a satisfactory development”. Significant 
also is that he stated that the Turkish military continues to play “significant, substantive and maybe pivotal 
… on the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations … No one can guarantee that Turkey will escape from 
this past logic.”  
199 Interview of George Valinakis, Deputy Foreign Minister of Greece in Turkish TV channel N-TV.  
Mr. Valinakis said the Greek government supports the European aspirations of Turkey. He additionally said 
that in the absence of “abnormal” conditions, Greece will say ‘yes’ to Turkey this December (for setting a 
date of accession negotiations) 8 May 2004 18:36.  See 
http://www.in.gr/news/article.asp?lngEntityID=536371&lngDtrID=244, accessed 8 May 2004. 
200 See Article 30 April 2004 23:29, Tayip Erdogan Declares that the EU Will Make the Right 
Decision (regarding opening accession negotiations)  
http://www.in.gr/news/article.asp?lngEntityID=534608 Tayip also said that Turkey has alternate solutions. 
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seems to relate the differences between the countries to the domestic organizational 
structure and problematic democratic institutions and governorship of Turkey. 
Consequently, Greece might believe that integration could solve many of the problems 
since integration means that Turkey would have aligned with the European standard. 
However, this implies that Greece relates the accession to a better understanding or a 
suitable solution to the long-standing dispute. Such a solution will be expected to be of 
definite interest to Greece or according to the law, since Greece believes that in many 
cases, Turkey violates international law. As stated previously, however, thus far, Greece 
has not been awarded for its friendly position and its consessional help towards Turkey’s 
accession.  
An important aspect is that Cyprus became a member without a political solution 
to the problem. Cyprus, on the other hand, since it is a member, can vote on EU policy, 
and could now block relative decisions if it feels that the problems continue to exist. 
Cyprus also has distanced itself from Greece, as was seen by the decision taken on the 
Anan plan which Cyprus rejected, although the official Greek stance was to support the 
plan. Cyprus is expected to cooperate with Turkey on a future solution to its problem. Its 
stance towards Turkey’s aspirations remains to be seen. Nonetheless, Cyprus is no longer 
a political “prerequisite” for Turkey, since Turkey appeared to support the Anan plan and  
tried to assist in the solution. Greece, on the other hand, will continue to be a great 
supporter of Turkey as is evidenced by its stance thus far, and from official statements. 
Greece might expect to gain from Turkey’s transformation, which could entail a peaceful 
settlement of its Eastern borders and increase in its own security. 
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Therefore, Greece will unlikely create impediments to Turkey’s effort at least in 
the short term. Both countries appear to be strongly interested in Turkey’s integration. 
Since Greece’s cooperation will continue as long as Turkey appears to respond positively 
to the good gesture, it also seems that the result will be Turkey’s responsibility. However, 
as stated based on  the examination of the relations between the two countries as well as 
the recent developments concerning the strong decisions made about the hotly debated 
issues, which might again be highlighted as security issues, it is unlikely to occur in the 
short term. It will also be unlikely that Turkey will take the initiative since the political 
costs will be greater for its politicians. Therefore, it is possible that the final decision will 
be made by the Hague Court. Thus, the dispute could prove a real impediment for 
opening accession negotiations with the country since it will be unlikely that the situation 
will be resolved by the end of 2004. The only way is again more time.  
Turkey, on the other hand, appears ready and confident about the opening of 
negotiations at the end of the 2004 even without the resolution of the dispute.201 
However, this will not be so easy since it was included in the Helsinki summit 
document.202 Moreover, it is one of the issues of the reports on Turkey’s progress 
towards accession.203 Finally, many analysts cited it as a prerequisite for opening 
accession negotiations204 and no real improvement on hotly debated issues has occurred. 
Nonetheless, a good environment exists that Turkey must exploit for its efforts. 
Turkey also enjoys the support of the United States205, and maybe the support of the EU 
as a result of the Anan plan since it was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots and rejected by 
the Greek Cypriots, which might imply that the plan was closer to Turkey’s interests. 
Therefore, the prospects are even more promising.  
                                                 
201 In his visit here at NPS, Professor Dr. Husein BAGCI (Department of International Relations in 
Middle East Technical University in Ankara and specialist in Turkey-EU relations) declared that the strong 
supporter of Turkey for EU accession is Greece. He also appeared confident that the EU will set the date 
for opening accession negotiations by the end of 2004. In my question of how is he sure since the problem 
with Greece has not been resolved, he answered that this is not a prerequisite. However, this seems to be a 
prerequisite (see the next three footnotes as well). Moreover, when I asked him about the status of minority 
rights implying the case of the Kurds, he replied that Turkey accepts those minorities included in the 
Lausanne Treaty. Even if Greece, as is obvious by the later official statements, seems ready to support the 
opening of accession negotiations, Greece will not be the only country that will determine the final 
decision. Additionally, if the dispute is to be taken in account, the dispute has not yet been resolved.  
202 See Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, par 4. 
203 See all the Reports for Turkey’s Progress towards accession since 1999. The concept of the dispute 
is included in the reports under the title: “Peaceful Settlement of Border Disputes” and it writes about the 
dispute with Greece. 
204 See for example F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, “Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of 
Uncertainty.” As the authors write “…EU made clear that a resolution of Turkey’s differences with Greece 
over the Aegean and Cyprus were a precondition for membership,” p. 87. 
205 See, for example, the statement by Grossman: US Supports Turkey's EU Target, 21 March 2002, 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_21_02/for.htm#f4, accessed 20 April 2004. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Helsinki summit accepted Turkey as a candidate member, and Turkey must 
comply with the political criteria. The current thesis explored the prospects for Turkey’s 
accession considering these political criteria. The research seems to indicate that Turkey 
has made much progress towards integration. However, Turkey might need more time to 
reach the final step.  
A. ISLAM 
Turkey’s progress and direction has been ubiquitous with the prevalence of 
political Islam in Turkey. However, the thesis argues that no such impediment could be 
important to Turkey’s European aspirations. Rather, political Islam in Turkey started and 
became stronger as a reactionary movement. The reasons for its strong presence result 
from the frustration of the people with the inability of the other political parties and the 
corruption present in Turkish politics. Other international as well as domestic factors 
contributed to the rise of political Islam in Turkey. Its first political attempts raised 
concerns since they seemed to pave a way for an Eastern orientation far removed from 
the Western ideological concept. However, it soon became obvious that political Islam 
became a supporter of the western orientation, and specifically for EU integration. This 
change, of course, might be a product of many factors, such as suppression by the 
military, since no other way existed for the party to remain on the political scene. 
Additionally, the country has a strong secular past. Thus, the possibility of Islamic rule 
such as in the case of Iran is extremely unlikely in the case of Turkey. The likely case 
will be a transformation of the Islamic party into more mainstream politics having as 
ideological concepts, the Islamic values akin to the Christian Democrats in Western 
societies. Thus, at least if the progress towards alignment with European standard goes 
well and the prospects remain stable, it is unlikely that the Islamic political resurgence 
will impede that process. 
B. MILITARY 
The military, however, although it might have assisted in the Islamic 
transformation or the elimination of the Islamic threat that it appeared to pose for the 
orientation of the country, the thesis argues that is might be the most important factor and 
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the final determinant for the Europeanization project’s outcome. Turkey thus far has 
undergone great progress. The Turkish government has declared repeatedly that its main 
objective is to meet the Copenhagen political criteria in time to allow a positive 
assessment by the Commission this year, and thereby, pave the way for a decision by the 
European Council in December 2004 to start accession negotiations with Turkey. 
However, this possibility remains unlikely. Turkey needs more progress in many aspects 
to meet the political criteria.  
The military has been the determinant factor in politics since the creation of 
modern Turkey. The first party was created by the military leadership. Since then, the 
military holds significant political power. As history shows, the military even behind the 
scenes was always ready to intervene to restore the situation, even though according to its 
own estimates, this was detrimental.. Its involvement might have been desirable in some 
cases in the past and appeared to have the approval of Turkey’s society. The military 
never directly holds  power, except for short periods of time after every coup. In some 
cases, it also only intervened via recommendations which were interpreted as orders, 
without taking power directly. Thus, the military, although it holds power, is beyond the 
accusations of mismanagement since it does not hold power directly. Such accusations 
are levied against the political elite, who, however, do not hold real power, or at least not 
enough to introduce strong reforms in the country. Therefore, the political elite appeared 
to be the bad link of the government and completely responsible of every bad outcome. 
Such a political elite could use clientilistic politics while constantly under the strong eye 
and control of the military elite. The driving factor for the military’s power relies upon 
the cultivation of security issues. Turkey’s past lends itself to insecurity issues and thus, 
the prevalence of security arguments which has been cultivated so far through 
educational means, helped to stabilize security instincts. Such feelings create 
impediments to reforms and progress inline with the European standards. Therefore,  a 
great impediment to reforms results from  the case of human rights and the Kurdish issue. 
C. HUMAN RIGHTS KURDISH  
Nonetheless, Turkey has improved its status concerning human rights. Minority 
rights also are in better shape than before the Helsinki decision and the creation of 
NPAA. However, even if progress has been made, many important aspects are still 
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unresolved. Moreover their resolution is unlikely to be happen, at least in the short term, 
under the current political conditions. Turkey’s steps towards human rights are rather 
impressive. However, minority rights are still not up to par. Turkey has not yet signed the 
Convention for Minorities. Any effort made towards the resolution of these issues is very 
difficult because the Kurdish issue, which is apt to be considered a minority rights issue, 
is also felt to be a security threat for the country. As such, implementation of strong steps 
will be very difficult. Moreover, the military establishment determines what security 
means as well as the country’s threats. Since the military’s power derives from the threats 
and security issues that the country faces, its position towards the Kurds will unlikely 
change at time soon. Also, the military, as this thesis argues, still possesses the power to 
impose its position and its will on the political elite at least on such important issues. 
Therefore, the impediments will likely remain until a calmer political approach will 
prevail in the country’s governorship.  
D. GREECE CYPRUS 
The same reasoning remains important for the Greece Turkey dispute. It is true 
that there is a cultivation of a better situation between the two sides. However, until now, 
there has been no resolution of the real dispute between the countries. Whatever 
concessions that might arise  concerning security issues might also increase security 
concerns for the military or even be impossible in the face of strong nationalist instincts. 
Thus, Turkey’s acceptance of this position that differs greatly from its long standing 
position towards Greece might also be unlikely at this point. Therefore, the integration 
must be executed at a future point in time when Turkey will enjoy a more mature posture.  
The resolution of the dispute might go to the Hague court.  Nonetheless, Greece is 
today a great supporter of Turkey’s European aspirations and seems to be in favor of 
setting a date for accession negotiations by the end of 2004. However, the dispute 
remains unresolved and such an issue could impede these negotiations, since it appears to 
be a prerequisite for Turkey’s prospects towards membership. Greece might say yes but 





To summarize, note that all aspects in Turkey are interrelated. Its greatest problem 
might be its lack of democratic values. This lack has to do with the level of civil military 
relations. The status of the military then continues to be strong. Its power derives from 
security reasons. Other important aspects of political criteria, such as minority rights and 
human rights, seem to contradict the feelings of security. Also, the military has been the 
factor that defines security. As such an important decision on the Kurds cannot be 
resolved, and the same applies for Greece Turkish rapprochement, great concessions are 
highly unlikely. Thus, the real transformation of Turkey will result from further changes 
to its civil-military relations. Afterwards, the country could implement the remainder of 
the reforms in a calmer environment with a higher probability of success.  
Even if Turkey expects the date for negotiations to be set, this thesis estimates 
that it will be unlikely to occur before the end of 2004. Turkey will be surprised as the 
data shows the assistance of Greece in these efforts, but Greece will not be the only 
determinant factor. The report of progress in 2004 will have a much greater impact as a 
determinant factor. It is unlikely that Turkey’s situation will change even though much 
progress has been made as many important issues are still unresolved. These include 
political reasons, human and minority rights, and actually, the still mainly unresolved 
dispute with Greece, although Greece is an apparent supporter of Turkey’s efforts. 
Moreover, the path of progress so far shows that time is not on Turkey’s side to 
implement the remaining reforms. Civil military relations continue to determine the path 
and the speed of the application of new reforms. Thus, a rather negative result is 
expected. However, this could have negative repercussions for the country which will 
surely appear as a result. If this is the case, then Turkey must be informed and receive 
special treatment in order to avoid undesirable changes in its orientations. Although the 
thesis states that Turkey has made great progress, and has extended great efforts thus far 
to reject the European project, as Turkey claims in case of rejection, the EU must treat the 
country in a cooperative manner. Moreover, for the political elite, success with the 
European project appears to be the only way to assert their role and move towards 
alignment with the EU civil military relations standards. Therefore, in order for the 
political elite to remain strong, or at least to continue its efforts for integration, Turkey 
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must be treated carefully by the EU and in a manner that will calm whatever 
disappointment that arises in the hope for immediate accession in the near term. Even if 
the estimates returned by this thesis based on raw data state that it is unlikely that the date 
will be set for the opening of negotiations for Turkey’s accession, such a possibility 
cannot be excluded. Actually, Turkey can achieve its goal with strong support from other 
countries, or if the member countries are convinced that Turkey’ path thus far can 
guarantee the implementation of the remaining reforms. Such an outcome will be very 
significant considering the country’s specific weight.  
Turkey is important as a paradigm for it can highlight how an institution can 
provide incentives for the creation of a better world. Turkey has undergone a great 
transformation in its internal society but also internationally as well as without being 
forced to do so. It was a willingness resulting from its desire to be included in a strong 
institution. The institution, on the other hand, simply established the criteria. 
Turkey’s case is important for the United States. A democratic Turkey can 
provide the paradigm that Islam and democracy are compatible in supporting the efforts 
of the Bush strategy for the expansion of democracy in the Muslim world. Turkey’s 
orientation towards the West is also very important in this effort since many Arab 
countries accuse the West of waging a war against Islam.206 A Muslim ally in this effort 
is extremely important. In any case, the inclusion of Turkey in the EU will demonstrate 
that the West is not prejudicial in any way towards the Muslim world.  
Turkey’s accession is expected also to relieve the tension in south East Europe 
and the Aegean Sea since it provides a better environment for cooperation among 
neighboring countries. Moreover, accession entails the resolution of border disputes as 
the EU therefore demands a peaceful arrangement of issues among neighboring countries. 
Thus, Turkey’s efforts towards the EU should receive support. Turkey’s path thus 
far also shows that Turkey is closer than ever to its aspirations. The importance of the 
aforementioned reasons necessitate that Turkey must be helped to implement the 
remaining reforms and enter the EU in a reasonable amount of time. 
                                                 
206 See David W. Lesch, “The Middle East and the United States. A Historical and Political 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
102 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, 8 
November 2000. 
2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession. 
Aee Umit Cizre, “Demythologyzing the National Security Concept: The Case of 
Turkey,” The Middle East Journal; Spring 2003, 57, 2. 
Ahmad, Feroz, “The Making of Modern Turkey.” 
Ali Carkoglu, “Turkey’s November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning?” Middle East 
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002). 
ANA (Athens News Agency) “Greece Desires Turkey's European Prospect, Spokesman 
says” 29 April 2004, 
http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=591&a
rticle=13401, accessed 5 May 2004. 
ANA (Athens News Agency) 06 December, 2003, Gov't on Turkey's EU Prospects after 
Archbishop's Tirade Replying to the Archbishop.”  
ANA (Athens News Agency) 17 December 2003, FM Papandreou: No Results Yet from 
Greek-Turkish Talks.  
ANA (Athens News Agency) 26 April 2004, “Final Results of Cyprus Referenda.”  
ANA (Athens News Agency) 27 April 2004, “EU Commissioner Says Outcome of 
Cyprus Referenda 'Not End of the Road.”   
ANA (Athens News Agency) Athens Continues to Back Turkey’s EU Prospects, 06 May, 
2004 Greek Foreign Minister Petros Molyviatis, 
http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=223&a
rticle=13439, accessed 7 May 2004. 
ANA 20 January 2004 22:05:44, “Gul Reiterates Papandreou’s Defense Spending 
Reduction P-proposal is Positive.” 
Article 30 April 2004 23:29, Tayip Erdogan Declares that the EU Will Make the Right 
Decision (regarding opening accession negotiations)  
http://www.in.gr/news/article.asp?lngEntityID=534608. 
Aydinli, Ersel and Waxman, Don, “A Dream Become Nightmare? Turkey’s Entry into 
the European Union,” Current History, November 2001. 
103 
Balkan, N. and Savran, S., “The Politics of Permanent Crisis. Class, Ideology and State in 
Turkey.” 
Bill, James A. and Springborg, Robert, “Politics in the Middle East.” 
Bora, Tanil, “National Discourses in Turkey.” 
Bozdogan, Sibel and Kasaba, Resat “Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in 
Turkey.”  
Broadcasts in Kurdish was allowed later. See “Regulations Legalizing Kurdish 
Broadcasts on State TV Adopted,” 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/12_19_02/dom.htm#d4, accessed 25 
March 2004. 
Cizre, Umit and Cinar, Menders, “Turkey2002: Kemalism, Islamism and Politics in the 
Light of February 28 Process.” 
Cizre, Umit, “Demythologyzing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey,” 
The Middle East Journal, Spring 2003, 57, 2. 
Commission of the European Communities Brussels, 9 October 2002, Sec (2002) 1412, 
“2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession.” 
Congress Speeches,” 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/06_01_01/dom.htm#d5, accessed 17 
March 2004. 
Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13 December 2002. Presidency Conclusions. 
Brussels, 29 January 2003, 15917/02, par. 18. 
Council of the European Union Brussels, 1 October 2003, 11638/03 Subject: 
Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003, Presidency Conclusions, Par 39. 
Council of the European Union Brussels, 29 January 2003, 15917/02 Subject: 
Copenhagen European Council, 12 and 13 December 2002, Presidency Conclusions, Par 
10. 
Council of the European Union Brussels, 5 May 2003, 8410/03 Subject: Brussels 
European Council 20 and 21 March, Presidency Conclusions, Par 85. 
Dagi, Ishan D., “Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community in 
Turkish Politics: The Ozal Years, 1983-87,” Middle Eastern Studies, January 2001, 37, 1. 
Denber, Rachel Acting Executive Director Europe and Central Asia Human Rights 
Watch. See http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/12/31/turkey7023.htm, accessed on 1 April 
2004. 
104 
European Council in Copenhagen 21-22 June 1993 Conclusions of the Presidency par 7. 
Fromkin, David, “A Peace to End All Peace. The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Creation of the Modern Middle East.  
Grossman, US Supports Turkey's EU Target, 21 March 2002, 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_21_02/for.htm#f4, accessed 20 April 
2004. 
Henze, Paul B., “Turkey: Towards the Twenty-First Century.” A Rand Note.  
Heper, Metin and Keyman, E. Fuat, “Political Patronage and the Consolidation of 
Democracy in Turkey.” 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/12/31/turkey7023.htm, “Human Rights Overview 2004 
for Turkey,” accessed 1 April 2004. 
http://www.ifes.org/eguide/resultsum/turkey_par02RES.htm, accessed 12 February 2004. 
http://www.in.gr/news/article.asp?lngEntityID=536428&lngDtrID=244, 09 May 2004 
18:30, accessed 9 May 2004. 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/ade/adeb/, accessed 10 February 2004. 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/ade/adeb/, accessed 15 April 2004. 
http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/aegean_continenta
l_shelf.html, accessed April 15 2004. 
http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/turkeys_claims_gr
eece_positions_aegean.html, accessed 12 March 2004. 
http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/bilateral.html, 
accessed 15 March 2004. 
http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/2002/1111/turkey/konya.html, accessed 20 
November 2003. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/FrTDN/latest/for.htm#f4, accessed 10 May 2004. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/02_23_00/dom.htm#d3, accessed 2 April 
2004. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/04_12_01/for.htm, accessed 17 March 
2004. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/06_13_01/dom.htm#d4, “Constitutional 
Court Weighs Fate of Virtue Party,” accessed 17 March 2004. 
105 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/06_23_01/dom.htm#d2, “Constitutional 
Court Bans Virtue Party,” accessed 17 March 2004. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/08_03_02/dom.htm#d1, accessed 17 
March 2004.  
Kadioglu, Ayse, “The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official 
Identity.” 
Kaplan, Sam, “Din-U Devlet All Over Again? The Politics of Military Secularism and 
Religious Militarism in Turkey Following the 1980 Coup,” International Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies, 34, 2002. 
“Kathimerini” Daily Newspaper of 8 April 2004. 
Kirisci, Kemal, “The Kurdish Question and Turkey.” 
Kosebalaban, Hasan, “Turkey’s EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures,” Middle 
East Policy, Vol. IX, June 2002. 
Kramer, Heinz, “A Changing Turkey. The Challenge to Europe and the United States.” 
Kranidiotis, Dr. Yannos, Speech delivered at the Conference on “The Enlargement of the 
European Union,” organized by The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign 
Policy (ELIAMEP) and the Embassy of Austria in Greece, 6-7 November 1998, Athens. 
http://www.eliamep.gr/_admin/upload_publication/175_1en_occ.PDF, accessed 2 March 
2004. 
Larrabee, F. Stephen and Lesser, Ian O., “Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of 
Uncertainty.” 
Larrabee, F. Stephen, RAND “The Middle East in the Shadow of Afghanistan and Iraq.” 
Lesch, David W., “The Middle East and the United States. A Historical and Political 
Reassessment.” 
Lesser, Ian O., “Turkey, Greece, and the U.S. in a Changing Strategy Environment: 
Testimony before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on 
Europe.”  
Luxembourg European Council Par. 27 Press Release: Luxembourg (12 December 
1997)-Press:0 Nr: SN400/97. 
Mango, Andrew, “Turkey and the Enlargement of the European Mind,” Middle Eastern 
Studies, April 1998, 34, 2. 
106 
Mango, Andrew, “Turkey the Challenge of a New Role,” pp. 77-85 The Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. Third World Quarterly December 
1997, Vol. 18, Issue 4. 
Melakopides, Costas, “Turkish Political Culture and the Future of the Greco-Turkish 
Rapprochement.” 
“Message on Cyprus to Ankara by Simitis,” Athens, 19 January 2004 (16:29 UTC +2) 
Daily News. 
Migdalovitz, Carol, “Iraq: The Turkish Factor,” CRS Report for Congress. Order Code 
RS21336, Updated 31 October 2002. 
Mitterand, Danielle, widow of the late French president Francois Mitterand in Meltem 
Muftuler-Bac “The Never Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union,” Middle 
Eastern Studies, October 1998, 34, 4. 
Muftuler-Bac, Meltem, “The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union,” 
Middle Eastern Studies: October 1998, 34. 
“Now It's Up to the People of Cyprus!”  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly_nl.htm#A, 
accessed 30 March 2004. 
Olson, Robert, “The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s.”  
Onis, Ziya Journal of International Affairs, “Neoliberal Globalization and the Democracy 
Paradox: The Turkish General Elections of 1999,” Fall 2000, 54, No. 1. 
Onis, Ziya Third World Quarterly, “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in 
Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective,” December 1997, Vol. 18, Issue 4. 
Ozbugdun, Ergun, Contemporary Turkish Politics, Challenges to Democratic 
Consolidation. 
Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999. 
Presidency Conclusions.  Brussels European Council, 26 March 2004, Par 49. 
Rouleau, Eric, “Turkey’s Dream of Democracy,” Foreign Affairs November/December 
2000. 
Sakallioglou, Umit Cizre, “Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in 
Republican Turkey,” International Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol. 28, No. 2. 
Schwedler, Jillian, “Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace or Mobilizer?” International Journal 
of Middle East Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2.  
107 
Seville European Council, 21 and 22 June 2002, Presidency Conclusions, par 24. 
Singerman, Diane, “Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban 
Quarter of Cairo,” Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Soli Ozel, “Turkey at the Polls. After the Tsunami.” 
The Commission of the European Communities Brussels, 13 November 2001, Sec (2001) 
1756, “2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards 
Accession.” 
The Commission of the European Communities Brussels, 9 September 2002, Sec (2002) 
1412, “2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards 
Accession.” 
The Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001 SEC (2001) 1756, 
“2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession.” 
“The Turkish Foreign Minister Signed the Olympic Truce Declaration,” Macedonian 
Press Agency, October 21, 2003 available online 
http://www.mpa.gr/article.html?doc_id=409934, accessed 30 March 2004.   
Turkish Daily News, 25 March 2001, 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_25_01/for.htm, accessed 10 March 
2004. 
Turkish Daily News, Turkey and Greece Sign Gas Pipeline Protocol, 29 March 2002, 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_29_02/for.htm#f8, accessed 28 
February 2004. 
Turkish Daily News, Turkey Decides to Accept to the Ottawa Convention on Land 
Mines, 16 March 2002, 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_16_02/for.htm#f6, accessed 10 March 
2004. 
“Turkish Legislature Makes History with Comprehensive Reforms” 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/08_03_02/dom.htm#d1, accessed 19 
March 2004. 
Valinakis, George, Deputy Foreign Minister of Greece in Turkish TV channel N-TV.  8 
May 2004 18:36.  See 
http://www.in.gr/news/article.asp?lngEntityID=536371&lngDtrID=244, accessed 8 May 
2004. 
Varvitsiotis, Ioannis M., “The Turkish Threat,” in Security in Southeastern Europe and 
the U.S.-Greek Relationships, Robert Pfaltzgraff and Dimitris Keridis eds., (Mclean, 
Virginia: Brassey’s, Inc. 1997). 
White, Jenny B. “Islamist Mobilization in Turkey.” 
108 
Wilkens, Katherine A., “Turkey Today: Troubled Ally’s Search for Identity.” 
“Will Closing HADEP Solve Our Problems?” 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/02_09_99/comment.htm, accessed 17 
March 2004. 
“Will the Program Usher Turkey into a New Era?” 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_19_01/for.htm#f4, accessed 15 
March, 2004.  
Wilson, Andrew, “The Aegean Dispute” The International Institute of Strategic Studies 
Winter 1979/80. 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
110 
111 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California  
 
3. Professor Robert Looney   
 National Security Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
4. Professor Donald Abenheim 
National Security Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. Hellenic Air Force General Staff 
 Athens, Greece    
 
6. Hellenic Air Force Academy 
 Athens, Greece 
 
7. Christos Zilidis 
 Neo Monastiri Domokos 
 TK 35010 
 Greece 
 
8. MAJ Paschalis Zilidis 
 Neo Monastiri Domokos 
 TK 35010 
 Greece 
